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SAFARI INTO THE SNAKE PIT: THE STATE-CREATED
DANGER DOCTRINE

Laura Oren*

INTRODUCTION

In 1989, in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Departmentof Social Services,' a
divided Supreme Court announced a substantive due process doctrine purporting
(once again) 2 to separate the realm of federal constitutional injury from the state law
field of private tort law, to differentiate governmental action from inaction, to
distinguish negative constitutional liberties from affirmative duties, and to underline
the boundary between the public and the private world.' The Court ruled that
"nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to

protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private
actors."4 Because the Constitution does not impose an affirmative obligation for

* Law Foundation Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. My thanks to
the University of Houston Law Foundation for financial assistance for this project. I am
grateful for the research assistance of Jeffrey Bentch. I also thank my colleague Irene
Rosenberg who always makes me work and always makes me think.
489 U.S. 189 (1989).
2 For earlier expressions of concern about drawing the line between constitutional and
ordinary torts so as to avoid making the Constitution "a font of tort law," see Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
' See, e.g., DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195-96, 201. For my critique of DeShaney's
constitutional analysis, see generally Laura Oren, The State'sFailureto ProtectChildrenand
Substantive Due Process: DeShaney in Context, 68 N.C. L. REv. 659 (1990) [hereinafter
Oren, State's Failure].

' DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195. DeShaney's substantive due process limitations should be
distinguished from, although they are related to, the "state action" doctrine of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In 1883, the Court invalidated the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited
private discrimination in public accommodations, such as inns and transportation, on the
grounds that the Fourteenth Amendment encompassed only "state action" and, therefore, did
not allow Congress to reach the conduct of private parties. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3, 11 (1883).

As a result of this ruling, modern civil rights statutes that reach private conduct have
been sustained on the basis of congressional commerce or spending powers rather than the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Nicholas J. Johnson, Plenary Power and Constitutional
Outcasts: Federal Power, Critical Race Theory, and the Second, Ninth, and Tenth
Amendments, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1555, 1598 (1996) (citing GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 145-51 (12th ed. 1991) (explaining that the difficulty of regulating
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"governmental aid," the State's inaction in the face of threatened harm from another
source generally does not violate the strictures of the Due Process Clause.' Thus,
the Court insisted that there was no abuse of government power in Wisconsin's
failure to save a young child who was in the state's child protection system from his
father's violence. 6
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion, however, introduced two caveats into its
polarized schematic. The first is the so-called "special relationship" exception to
the rule of no entitlement to governmental protection.' Thus, the government may
acquire affirmative constitutional duties of protection under certain limited
circumstances: "[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him
there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to
8
assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being." The Court
cited examples of incarceration or involuntary civil commitment "or other similar
restraint of personal liberty. '
The second implicit exception to the no-duty rule arises from the following
language in DeShaney:
While the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua
faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor
did it do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them.
That the State once took temporary custody of Joshua does not
alter the analysis, for when it returned him to his father's
custody, it placed him in no worse position than that in which
he would have been had it not acted at all; the State does not
become the permanent guarantor of an individual's safety by

private action through the Fourteenth Amendment was the primary reason behind grounding
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on the Commerce Clause). In United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000), the Court reaffirmed the nineteenth-century state action ruling and held that
neither the Commerce Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to
create a civil rights action for domestic violence.
The defendants in DeShaney were state actors whose conduct was, therefore, encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,
937 (1982) (holding that a defendant may be a state actor because he is a state official). The
state actors were accused, however, of inaction in the face of a private party's brutality. Thus,
the issue became whether the state actors owed the boy any affinmative duties of protection
against his father's predations. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200.
5 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195-96.
6 Id. at 191.
7 Id. at 199-200.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 200. The majority expressly reserved the issue of whether or not foster care
constituted the kind of "custody" that would satisfy the new test. See id. at 201 n.9.
1166
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having once offered him shelter. Under these circumstances, the
State had no constitutional duty to protect Joshua."°
These words were the genesis of what is called the state-created danger doctrine,
which is the subject of this Article. 1
In the years since 1989, most of the circuits have accepted the state-created
danger doctrine in fact situations as diverse as the police intervening to arrest a
driver and then abandoning his passenger, a young woman who was subsequently
raped, in a high crime area; 2 or school officials suspending a suicidal special
educational student and driving him home in the middle of the day without
informing his parents. 3 In expressing their understanding of the state-created
danger doctrine, many courts of appeals echo the words of a Seventh Circuit
opinion written before DeShaney.'4 Anticipating the DeShaney approach, in
Bowers v. DeVito, 5 Judge Posner contrasted the Constitution as "a charter of
negative liberties," which "tells the state to let people alone," to any claim that the
Constitution contains affirmative duties "to provide services, even so elementary
a service as maintaining law and order."' 6 However, even with this view, he
conceded that a different result is obtained where the state crossed the line from
inaction to action:
We do not want to pretend that the line between action and
inaction, between inflicting and failing to prevent the infliction
of harm, is clearer than it is. If the state puts a man in a position of danger from private persons and then fails to protect
him, it will not be heard to say that its role was merely passive;
it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a
17
snake pit.
'oId. at 201 (emphasis added).
" See Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 n.7 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that DeShaney
"planted the seed" for the state-created danger doctrine).
12 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989).
13 Armijo v. Wagon Mound Pub. Schs., 159 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998). But see Martin
v. Shawano-Gresham Sch. Dist., 295 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the suicide of
student suspended for having cigarettes does not invoke the state-created danger doctrine).
14 See, e.g., Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1066 (6th Cir. 1998); Kneipp
v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1207 (3d Cir. 1996); Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 n.6 (10th
Cir. 1995); Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1180 (4th Cir. 1995); Cornelius v. Town of
Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348, 354 (1 lth Cir. 1989).
'5 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982).
16 Id. at 618. For the line of cases rejecting claims of social justice for the poor to fill
basic needs, see Oren, State's Failure,supra note 3, at 693 n.258.
17 Bowers, 686 F.2d at 618.
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Since 1989, the search for (non-"custodial") constitutional liability for the
State's failure to protect someone from injury by third parties has been a safari
into this "snake pit." Liability under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment will attach only if the State can be said to have crossed the putative
line between action and inaction by creating the danger or substantially increasing
it. Moreover, taking their cues from subsequent Supreme Court decisions on
other related points, the circuits have held that the journey into the snake pit
also requires an extremely high level of culpability to be actionable. No matter
how it is defined, "deliberate indifference" is the minimum standard required.
It is a degree of responsibility that assumes different content in different
contexts, and which, therefore, may or may not, equate with conscience8
shocking conduct.'

I. AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES BEFORE DESHANEY
The Court first recognized limited affirmative constitutional duties to protect
individuals from harm in the context of various kinds of "special relationships."
These responsibilities were derived from either the Eighth Amendment or the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth and were identified in Estelle v. Gamble, 9
2
' and Youngberg v. Romeo." In Estelle, the Court acknowlMartinez v. California,
edged that state inaction, through conscious indifference to the serious medical
needs of an inmate, could violate the Eighth Amendment.22 Dicta in Martinez
suggested that facts that overcame that case's proximate cause and special relationship problems might state a Due Process Claim.23 Finally, in Youngberg, the Court
recognized a due process right of an involuntarily committed man, who had the
intelligence of a very young child, to safety and protection from assaults by other
patients and from his own self-destructive acts. 24 Each of these decisions provided
some basis for concluding that under appropriate circumstances, the Constitution
could be violated by inaction, and not just by aggressive state action.

is
20

21
22
23
24

See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
429 U.S. 97 (1976).
444 U.S. 277 (1980).
457 U.S. 307 (1982).
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
Martinez, 444 U.S. at 285.
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 309, 316.
1168
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I. THE ROAD TO THE SNAKE PIT: DESHANEY LIMITS "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS"
Despite the compelling facts of the DeShaney case,2" the majority used it to
announce a very rigorous and ideological view of affirmative duties under the
Constitution. The Court insisted that because Joshua's father injured him while the
child was in "the free world," the Department of Social Services' knowledge of the
specific danger to that particular child and promises made to protect him did not
create any state duties.26 The normative rule was that the Constitution promised that
the State itself should not deprive anyone of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, but that it "confer[red] no affirmative right to governmental aid,
even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests
of which the government itself may not deprive the individual." 7
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court rejected the notion that a
constitutionally-based "special relationship" arose out of the knowledge of four
year-old Joshua DeShaney's peril or the State's specific undertaking to keep him
safe, as some pre-DeShaney circuits had concluded from the dicta in Martinez.28
A four-year-old boy was beaten into a permanent coma by his father. The State's child
protection service had learned about possible abuse by his custodial father when the boy was
just two years old. The first file was closed without action, but in 1983, Joshua was seen in
the hospital emergency room where doctors identified him as a victim of child abuse. He was
taken into temporary legal custody while the complaint was investigated, but the Department
of Social Services returned him to his father, simultaneously entering into an agreement
for the child's monitoring and protection. Unfortunately, the Department did nothing to
enforce the agreement and took no action as, over the next fourteenth months, the child was
repeatedly brought to hospital emergency rooms for suspected traumatic injuries. The caseworker failed to see the child as required, but she did document in the case file her belief that
he was in serious danger. Finally, the cumulative effect of the abuse produced permanent
brain damage. See Oren, State's Failure,supra note 3, at 660-62.
25

26 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
27 Id. at 196 (citing Harris v. McCrae,

448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980)) (holding that the
State has "no obligation to fund abortions or other medical services"); Lindsey v. Normet,
405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (finding no constitutional obligation to provide adequate housing).
But see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that the State of Texas may not deprive
undocumented school children of all education). In 1977, Laurence Tribe argued that one of
the Burger Court's states' rights cases, Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976),
paradoxically could be understood as a case that supports the logic of affirmative rights "in
a just constitutional order" through its distinction between essential and non-essential government services. Laurence H. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities; The New
Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1065, 1065 (1977). Usery was subsequently overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.

TransitAuth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
28 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197 n.4 (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 855 F.2d
1421, 1426 (9th Cir. 1988); Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 510-11 (3d
Cir. 1985); Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 190-94 n. 1 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
1169
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Rather, the only kind of special relationship that triggered affirmative duties was
one in which the State takes someone into "custody," thereby depriving him of
liberty and the ability to protect himself, as was the case of the inmate in Estelle and
the developmentally disabled man in Youngberg.29 By contrast, Chief Justice
Rehnquist repeatedly emphasized that Joshua was in his father's custody when he
was beaten into permanent brain damage. He was in the "free world" where no
governmental responsibilities accrue, even in the face of awareness of a clear
danger to a specific person. Awareness of the danger might well trigger a state
common law tort responsibility, but the majority insisted that this had nothing to
do with the criteria for federal substantive due process rights.30 "The most that can
be said of the state functionaries in this case is that they stood by and did nothing
when suspicious circumstances dictated a more active role for them."31 Such omissions, however, failed to provide the basis for the "Court's expansion of the Due
Process Clause. 32
U.S. 1052 (1985)). The Court reiterated later in the opinion that its own definition of "special
relationships" for constitutional purposes was not defined by state tort law developments
under that heading. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201-02 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 323 (1965)) ("[Olne who undertakes to render services to another may in some
circumstances be held liable for doing so in a negligent fashion."); see also W. PAGE
KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORkTs § 56 (5th ed. 1984)
(discussing special relationships which may give rise to affirmative duties to act under the
common law of tort). Cf. Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1962)
(reversing the manslaughter conviction of a woman accused of failing to provide the
necessities of food to an infant due to faulty jury instructions). In Jones, the court discussed
the distinctions between commissions and omissions in criminal law and when affirmative
duties may arise. The court noted that the failure to act generally did not violate criminal law,
but it did identify exceptions to the general rule:
There are at least four situations in which the failure to act may
constitute breach of a legal duty. One can be held criminally liable:
first, where a statute imposes a duty to care for another; second, where
one stands in a certain status relationship to another; third, where one
has assumed a contractual duty to care for another; and fourth, where
one has voluntarily assumed the care of another and so secluded the
helpless person as to prevent others from rendering aid.
Id. (citations omitted). For a consideration of the legal distinction between omissions and
commissions, especially the law of rescue, see generally Saul Levmore, Waitingfor Rescue:
An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structureof the Law of Affirmative Obligations,72
VA. L. REv. 879 (1986).
29

DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200.
Ild. at 201-02.

3I ld. at 203.
32 Id. The majority's depiction of the state actors as purely passive is misleading, at best.
Justice Brennan, for example, observed in his dissent that the state in fact had "acted" in
many ways, most importantly in monopolizing all sources of relief for children subjected to
parental abuse. The child welfare system funneled all aid through its exclusive institutions.

1170

2005]

SAFARI INTO THE SNAKE PIT

By contrast to the many words devoted to action versus inaction, negative

liberties versus affirmative duties, and the significance of "custody," neither the
Court nor the dissenting opinions in DeShaney paid much attention to the other
pathway to state responsibility; that is, the snake pit argument that might be made
where a State can be said to have created the danger in the first place or to have
made things worse for the person it failed to protect.33 In dissent, Justice Brennan

suggested that "[c]onceivably, then, children like Joshua are made worse off by the
existence of this program when the persons and entities charged with carrying it out
fail to do their jobs."34 The majority's dicta recognized the state-created danger
caveat by negative implication; it emphasized that "while the State may have been
aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in the free world, it played no part in their
creation, nor did it do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them."35 In

Chief Justice Rehnquist's view, that inaction even extended to the decision to return
the boy to his father's custody. Since he had started there, he ended up in no worse
position than he would have been in if the state had never intervened at all.
Moreover, since the Court found no liability under any constitutional theory, it
refrained from addressing the state-of-mind question: what mens rea is necessary
to violate the Due Process Clause?36
Ill. STATE-CREATED DANGER AFTER DESHANEY: THE SNAKE PIT IN THE CIRCUITS

Inevitably, the outcome of the DeShaney decision was to squeeze off new
avenues of the "special relationship" doctrine and, therefore, the decision turned

The system directed the police and concerned neighbors and family to refer child abuse
problems to child welfare. There was no fallback for children who were not protected due
to grave deficits in the child welfare system. Justice Brennan concluded that "[t]hese
circumstances ... plant this case solidly within the tradition of cases like Youngberg and
Estelle." Id. at 210 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
I have argued further that the context of the child protection system touches the due
process claim with an equal protection overtone. Oren, State's Failure,supranote 3, at 712.
Because the rationale for treating children differently, including denying them the protections
of the criminal justice system when their parents abuse them, rests on a quid pro quo, the
State acquires affirmative duties to fulfill the terms of the social contract. If the State
effectively decriminalizes a broad swath of child abuse by funneling it through the child
protective system, then the State incurs an obligation to afford protection in some other
fashion. If it fails to do so arbitrarily and irrationally, that failure should violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
" The Court remarked that Petitioners conceded that "the State played no part in
creating" Joshua's danger. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197.
14 Id. at 210 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
36 Id. at 20 1.
16 Id.

at 202 n.10.
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attention to the possibilities of "state-created danger."37 Under the new, "custodial"
version of special relationships, very few relationships qualified outside of the
obvious contexts of incarceration or civil commitment." For example, despite the
legal compulsion to attend school, courts generally have rejected the idea that
children in public schools are in "custody" for purposes of creating affirmative
duties.39 Even injury inflicted on children in foster care, which the DeShaney Court
did not rule out as satisfying the "custody" test for special relationships, ° is
problematic in the lower courts.4 Thus, after 1989, the action in the inaction arena
3"The specific term, "state-created danger," seems to have come into currency with D.R.
v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding no

state-created danger when public high school students were allegedly molested by other
students).
38 See, e.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696,700 (9thCir. 1990) (recognizing that DeShaney "limited the circumstances giving rise to 'a special relationship').
39See, e.g., Martin v. Shawano-Gresham Sch. Dist., 295 F.3d 701, 708 n.6 (7th Cir.
2002) (collecting cases); cf Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist. (Stoneking i1), 882 F.2d
720, 724-25 (3d Cir. 1989). On remand from the Supreme Court to be considered in light
of DeShaney, the Third Circuit concluded in Stoneking II that the question of "custody" was
irrelevant where sexual abuse was inflicted on a student by a state-actor teacher rather than
by a third party. Id.
These nearly universal findings of "no custody" in school are ironic in light of other
decisions of the Court finding that school officials exercise significant "custodial and
tutelary" authority over students. See Irene Merker Rosenberg, Public School Drug Testing:
The Impact ofActon, 33 AM. CRIj. L. REv. 349, 374-75 (1996). Professor Rosenberg compares Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), which upheld random urinalysis
drug testing of grade school and high school children who want to participate in extracurricular activities, with DeShaney:
Walking a thin line, Justice Scalia repeatedly acknowledged the
custodial, in loco parentis rights of school officials, while at the same
time citing DeShaney and stating that "we do not, of course, suggest
that public schools as a general matter have such a degree of control
over children as to give rise to a constitutional 'duty to protect."' While
this dictum is not dispositive of whether school attendance pursuant to
the compulsory education laws constitutes custody within the meaning
of DeShaney, it intimates that students may lose on this question as
well. In any event, the general message that comes across clearly is,
"heads the school officials win and tails the child loses."
Id. at 375 (quoting Acton, 515 U.S. at 655) (footnote omitted).
4 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9.
41 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Svcs., 380 F.3d 872,
882-883 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that state defendants were not liable under "special
relationship" theory for fatal injury to baby in state-licensed foster care because they did not
act with "deliberate indifference"); see also Burton v. Richmond, 370 F.3d 723 (8th Cir.
2004) (distinguishing custodial relationship in state initiated foster care from state ratification
of arrangements made by relatives of the child). Foster care remains very dangerous for the
children the state places there for their own safety. See Laura Oren, DeShaney's Unfinished
1172
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shifted to state-created danger claims. The more successful factual situations from
the plaintiff s perspective ranged from failure to protect from domestic violence;"2
43
to police abandonment of intoxicated victims who later suffered harm; to
mishandling of police/citizen standoffs;" to the public identification of a police
informant who was consequently murdered; 45 to a prison nurse raped and terrorized by an inmate;4 6 to an incident in which police called to the scene of a medical
emergency cancelled the paramedics and left the victim locked in his house;47 to a
suicidal special education student sent home alone in the middle of the day without
parental notification."a For every case that survived a dismissal or motion for summary judgment in the courts of appeals, however, many more failed. For example,
DeShaney seems to have sealed the fate of children's protection claims against child
welfare systems.49
Although every circuit, except for the fifth,5" has embraced the concept of statecreated danger, they also have imposed progressively more stringent standards to
sustain such claims. This development was influenced in part by post-DeShaney
substantive due process cases in which the Supreme Court required proof of
Business: The Foster Child's Due ProcessRight to Safety, 69 N.C. L. REv. 113, 114 & n.2
(1990); see also Polly Ross Hughes, No Quick FixforAbuse Crisis:A Committee Issues 200
Pages ofAdvice and Callsfor More Oversightof FosterCare,Hous. CHRON., Dec. 7, 2004,
at B 1 (noting the rediscovered scandal in the Texas system and quoting comptroller Carole
Keeton Strayhorn as "calling for major changes to protect children in the foster care system
from abuse and neglect while in state care"). For a critique of the involuntary versus
"voluntary" placement distinction, see Oren, supra, at 117 n. 22, 133-42.
42 Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1990); cf. Gonzales v. Cityof Castle Rock,
366 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 417 (2004) (recognizing
proceduraldue process claim for failure to enforce protective order by arresting father who
kidnaped and subsequently murdered his three children).
4 Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199 (3d Cir. 1996).
Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2003).
4 Monfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 1998).
" L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1992).
17 Penilla v. City of Huntington Park, 115 F.3d 707 (9th Cir. 1997).
48 Armijo v. Wagon Mound Pub. Schs, 159 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998).
49 See, e.g., Powell v. Ga. Dep't of Human Res., 114 F.3d 1074 (1 lth Cir. 1997) (affirming dismissal of claim against state welfare agencies and workers based on allowing baby
to leave safety of home of aunt with temporary custody to return to mother's home where
child died).
50 But see infra notes 332-68 and accompanying text (discussing Scanlan v. Tex. A&M
Univ., 343 F.3d 533 (5th Cir. 2003), which reversed district court dismissal of Texas A&M
bonfire case for failure to state a claim and remanding for further proceedings); Rivera v.
Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 249 (5th Cir. 2003) (calling into question circuit's
recognition of state-created danger doctrine even after Scanlan); Davis v. Southerland, No.
CIV.A.G-01-720, 2004 WL 1230278 (S.D. Tex. May 21, 2004) (dismissing on the basis of
qualified immunity because assuming that after Scanlanthere is a state-created danger theory
in the Fifth Circuit, it was not clearly established at the time of the bonfire events).
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difficult state-of-mind elements. 5 Some courts of appeals subsequently incorporated these high mens rea elements in the state-created danger context. Virtually
all the courts assumed that "deliberate indifference" was the minimum mental state
in state-created danger cases. After the decisions in 1992 in Collins v. City of
HarkerHeights 2 and 1998 in County of Sacramento v. Lewis,53 however, some of
them also asked if the conduct "shocked the conscience" sufficiently to state a due
process violation.
A. The Early Explorers: Circuits That Recognized the DangerDoctrine Before
1996
There are three underlying issues in any state-created danger case: (1) has the
victim suffered an invasion of a "liberty interest"; 54 (2) has the state created or
caused the danger that inflicted the loss;55 and (3) has the state official who threw
someone into the snake pit acted with the requisite degree of culpability? 6 The first
issue has not been a problem in the state-created danger cases, as the injuries
claimed typically involve loss of life or bodily integrity.57 DeShaney's dicta,
however, made the second issue critical to the danger doctrine. Outside of custodial
special relationships, there seemed to be only one other way that the State could
acquire affirmative duties to protect someone from injury by a third party: by
causing the dangerous situation in the first place (or increasing the victim's
vulnerability). It is not surprising, therefore, that the first circuit to adopt the state"' See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,846,853-54 (1998); Collins v. City
of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126-28 (1992).
52 503 U.S. 115 (1992) (denying relief to widow ofstate worker killed after being ordered
to enter unsafe sewer pipe).
"' 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (holding that a high-speed police chase resulting in suspect's
death is not a due process violation without proof of intent to injure).
" See, e.g., Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 591 n.8 ("[Plaintiff] has shown sufficient
facts which, if proven at trial, establish a violation of her right to personal security, a liberty
interest protected by the fourteenth amendment.").
15 See, e.g., id. at 588; L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 121 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding
that actions of prison officials placed prison nurse in danger of being raped by assigning violent sex offender inmate to work with her alone in the clinic); Penilla v. City of Huntington
Park, 11 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that police officers who went to home and
found victim in medical distress on his porch, cancelled the 911 call for the paramedics,
dragged him inside an empty house and then locked the door and left him alone, all after
determining he had serious medical needs, "took affirmative actions that significantly
increased the risk facing" the victim).
56 See, e.g., Wood, 879 F.2d at 587.
57 Bodily integrity is a recognized liberty interest. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702 (1997) (recognizing that liberty protected by Due Process Clause includes, inter
alia, "bodily integrity"); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 237 (1990) ("Every violation
of a person's bodily integrity is an invasion of his or her liberty.").
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created danger theory after DeShaney focused on factual disputes surrounding the
state's alleged creation of the danger. The Ninth Circuit was the first court of
appeals to confirm the state-created danger theory after the Supreme Court decision
58
the court of appeals reversed a
in DeShaney. In 1989, in Wood v. Ostrander,
case.59 The plaintiff was a
danger
a
state-created
in
dismissal
judgment
summary
passenger in a car that was impounded when its driver was arrested for intoxication. The plaintiff alleged that the night was cold and dark, and that the trooper
abandoned her at 2:30 a.m. in a high crime area. After refusing several rides, the
woman, who was not dressed for the weather, reluctantly accepted one from an
unknown man who raped her.' °
The Ninth Circuit held that the state-created danger theory requires that the
defendant "affirmatively placed the plaintiff in a position of danger."'" In
evaluating the requirement that the State cause the danger, the Ninth Circuit found
that the facts in Wood were much like those in White v. Rochford,6 2 a Seventh
Circuit decision which pre-dated DeShaney. In Rochford, three minor children were
in a car with their uncle when police officers stopped them on a busy Chicago
highway. The police arrested the uncle for drag-racing and, despite his pleas to take
the children to safety or let him call their parents, left all three children in an
abandoned vehicle by the side of the road. As a result, they had to walk over dangerous roads at night to find a telephone. Even after they contacted their mother,
who had no car, the police refused to assist her in recovering the minors. Emotional
and physical injuries led to the one-week hospitalization of the five-year-old.63 The
Rochford court held that police officers may not "with constitutional impunity,
having
abandon children and leave them in health-endangering situations after
64
protection."
adult
of
them
deprived
thereby
and
custodian
their
arrested

58

879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989).

59 Id.

6 Id.

Id. at 589-90 (quoting Ketchum v. Alameda County, 811 F.2d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir.
1987)). The majority briefly cited DeShaney to distinguish that case's "situation where the
state 'played no part' in creating the dangers that the minor child faced by remaining in his
father's custody, 'nor did [the state] do anything to render [the child] any more vulnerable
to them."' Id. at 590 (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201).
62 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
63 Id. at 382.
4 Id. The Rochford court found that these allegations "shocked the conscience" in the
sense of Rochin v. California's, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), condemnation of arbitrary
government conduct. Rochford, 592 F.2d at 383-84. The Seventh Circuit found it
"incongruous to suggest that liability should turn on the tenuous metaphysical construct
which differentiates sins of omission and commission." Id. at 384. Finally, the lack of intent
to injure the children was not dispositive where the conduct was so grossly negligent or
recklessly indifferent "in the face of known dangers." Id. at 385.
61
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In order to decide the qualified immunity defense issue in Wood, the Ninth
Circuit evaluated the impact of the Seventh Circuit's Rochford case and found that
the latter had precedential effect.6" The Ninth Circuit also concluded that removing
the car and abandoning the woman in a high-crime area fit Judge Posner' s description of throwing someone into the snake pit."
The Eleventh Circuit joined the expedition into the snake pit early on, with its
decision in Corneliusv. Town of HighlandLake.67 Harriet Cornelius was abducted
from the town hall where she was employed as a clerk and terrorized for three days
by prison inmates who were assigned to work in the community.6 8 She sued a
number of defendants, including her employers and prison officials who knew of
the violent background of the inmates, but who nonetheless assigned them to the
outside work squad.69 The court of appeals held that the employee alleged a statecreated danger claim. 70 It reasoned that town officials increased the plaintiffs
vulnerability by controlling her work conditions, and that prison officials affirmatively acted together with them in the community work program, with a consequence
that Cornelius was placed "in a position of danger distinct from that facing the
public at large."'" In other words, the combined actions of the defendants "significantly increased both the risk of harm to the plaintiff, and the opportunity for the
72
inmates to commit the harm.,
The Cornelius reasoning, however, later suffered a number of blows in the
Eleventh Circuit, 73 and was finally declared "dead and buried" in White v.
Wood, 879 F.2dat 594-95. The significance of this precedential effect is that it defeats
a qualified immunity defense. Id.at 596. For a discussion of special problems associated with
that defense, see infra Part VII.
66 Wood, 879 F.2d at 594. The Wood majority glossed over the third element in statecreated danger claims, mens rea, and focused chiefly on factual disputes about causation. Id.
at 590. The dissent, however, thought that the requisite degree of culpability was more of an
issue. Id. at 601 (Carroll, J., dissenting).
67 880 F.2d 348, 354 (11 th Cir. 1989), overruled in part, White v. Lemacks, 183 F.3d
1253, 1258-59 (11 th Cir. 1999) (overruling special danger part of Wood because it failed to
survive the Supreme Court's reasoning in Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115
(1992), insofar as it failed to require conscience-shocking conduct, rather than mere
deliberate indifference).
68 Id. at 349.
69 Id. at 351.
70 Id. at 354-56. The Eleventh Circuit had previously rejected a special relationship claim
in Wright v. City of Ozark, 715 F.2d 1513 (1lth Cir. 1983). Cornelius, 880 F.2d at 353.
71 Cornelius, 880 F.2d at 357.
65

72

id.

71 See White v. Lemacks, 183 F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Mitchell v. Duval

County Sch. Bd., 107 F.3d 837, 838-39 & n.3 (11th Cir. 1997)); Hamilton v. Cannon, 80
F.3d 1525, 1531 n.6 (I lth Cir. 1996); Lovins v. Lee, 53 F.3d 1208, 1211 (1lth Cir. 1995);
Wooten v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 696, 700 n.4 (lth Cir. 1995); Wright v. Lovin, 32 F.3d 538,
541 n.1 (11th Cir. 1994).
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Lemacks.74 The Eleventh Circuit did not repudiate the state-created danger doctrine,
or the kind of causation analysis that requires state actors to affirmatively create the

danger or increase the victim's vulnerability. Rather, the court decided that state
employees, like the town hall clerk in Cornelius and prison nurses in Lemacks,
could not benefit from the doctrine under the same terms as other victims.75 The
Eleventh Circuit made it clear that it would be very difficult indeed to find that
situations involving workplace safety crossed the constitutional line. There were
two reasons for this reluctance. First, it was a question of philosophy. Local
officials should not be on the hook for decisions that may place employees at risk:
[Decisions] concerning the allocation of resources to individual
programs ....and to particular aspects of those programs such

as the training and compensation of employees, involve a host
of policy choices that must be made by locally elected representatives, rather than by federal judges interpreting the basic
charter of Government for the entire country. The Due Process
Clause is not a guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions. Nor does it guarantee municipal employees a
workplace that is free of unreasonable risks of harm."6
Second, because of this concern for the protection of local decision making, in order
to be found constitutionally liable at any time, officials would have to exhibit a very
high and unusual degree of culpability.77 For the Lemacks court, this hurdle is the
only way to distinguish between ordinary state tort law claims and a true due
process violation: "[W]hen someone not in custody is harmed because too few
resources were devoted to their safety and protection, that harm will seldom, if ever,
be cognizable under the Due Process Clause.""8
183 F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1254.
76 Id. at 1257 (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128-29 (1992)).
id. at 1258.
78 Id. The Eleventh Circuit subsequently has taken this sentiment beyond state employees'
work conditions to apply to a school situation where the injury was not even inflicted at the
hands of athird party. In Nix v. FranklinCounty Sch. Dist., 311 F.3d 1373 (11
th Cir. 2002),
a teacher instructed students to hold on to a live wire during a science experiment. He
informed his high school students that if they accidently touched the exposed part of the wire,
they might die. Then he turned up the power, turned his head away from the class, and then
turned back again to find a student gasping for breath. In denying relief to the parents of the
deceased student, the court characterized its precedents as "explicit in stating that 'deliberate
indifference' is insufficient to constitute a due-process violation in a non-custodial setting."
Id. at 1377; see also Waddell v. Henry County Sheriff's Office, 329 F.3d 1300 (11 th Cir.
2003). In Waddell, an inmate was released and recruited as a confidential informant, despite
his long history of substance abuse and drunk driving, and then provided with a car which
14
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The 1992 Supreme Court decision in Collins v. Harker Heights79 contributed
to the Eleventh Circuit's Lemacks-ian version of state-created danger. Collins also
involved workplace safety of a state employee. The Eleventh Circuit viewed it as
support for a ruling that local officials, who offer less protection to their employees because of necessary decisions about allocating scarce resources, should not
suffer constitutional liability unless the local officials' actions truly shocked the
conscience. 0 Even "deliberate indifference" did not meet this high standard in the
"context of routine decisions about employee or workplace safety.'
The Eighth Circuit joined the expedition into the snake pit a year after the
ruling in DeShaney. The court moved cautiously at first, observing that "it is not
clear, under DeShaney, how large a role the state must play in the creation of danger
and in the creation of vulnerability before it assumes a corresponding constitutional
duty to protect., 82 Nonetheless, the plaintiffs in Freemanv.: Fergusonwere allowed
to amend a complaint alleging that the police chief s personal relationship with the
estranged husband (and father) of the two victims led him to interfere actively with
the enforcement of a restraining order, rendering the two women more vulnerable
to the continuing threats, which culminated in their deaths.83
Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit grappled further with the question of what it
takes to find that state actors affirmatively placed someone in danger. In two split
en banc decisions the court found the factual allegations wanting.84 Gregory v. City
of Rogers, 5 involved officers who stopped a man (who was a "designated driver"

he drove while drunk, crashing and killing an innocent bystander:
In White v. Lemacks we concluded, however, that the "special
relationship" and "special danger" doctrines were superceded by the
standard employed by the Supreme Court in Collins. Thus, conduct by
a government actor will rise to the level of a substantive due process
violation only if the act can be characterized as arbitrary or conscience
shocking in a constitutional sense.
Id. at 1305 (citations omitted). The court continued: "But even conduct by a government
actor that would amount to an intentional tort under state law will rise to the level of a
substantive due process violation only if it also 'shocks the conscience."' Id. (citations
omitted). The Waddell court questioned whether deliberate indifference would satisfy the
standard, as opposed to either "deliberate indifference to a substantial certainty of serious
injury," or a finding that the official acted "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose
of creating a serious injury." Id. at 1306 n.5.
7' 503 U.S. 115 (1992).
80 Lemacks, 183 F.3d at 1258.

Id.
Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990).
83 Id. at 54.
S.S. v. McMullen, 225 F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 2000); Gregory v. City of Rogers., 974 F.2d
1006 (8th Cir. 1992).
8 974 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1992).
81

82
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for the evening) for running a red light. 86 An officer, the designated driver, and his
passengers went to the police station, to check out a minor outstanding warrant on
the driver.87 The driver left his keys in the ignition and his friends waiting in the
car.88 Approximately thirty minutes lateroneof the two intoxicated passengers drove
away and had a single-car accident, killing himself and injuring the passenger.89 A
split court of appeals determined that these allegations failed to state a constitutional claim because it could not be said that the police created the danger or made the
victims more vulnerable.9" Instead, all responsibility for the precarious situation was
laid at the feet of the designated driver who could have made other arrangements
for the safety of his intoxicated friends or confiscated the car keys.9 The dissent,

on the other hand, thought it was a closer fact question. 92 The dissenting judges
were troubled by the question of how obvious it was that the driver was designated
and that his friends were drunk and should not be left to their own devices.93
In S.S. v. McMullen, 94 the en banc Eighth Circuit split again over how much
affirmative action it takes for state actors to become responsible for a danger posed
by a third person. In a case all too similar to DeShaney, the Missouri Division of
Family Services returned a child to her father's custody even though they knew of
his close ties to a known pedophile who subsequently assaulted the child and about
the father's unconventional ideas about child rearing.9 5 Even though two and a half
86
87

Id. at 1007.
Id. at 1008.

8 Id. at 1012.

'9 Id. at 1008.
90 Id. at 1011-12.
9' Id. at 1012. The car was sitting on a well-lit street in front of a police station, and its
occupants had not been abandoned in a high crime area as was the case in Rochford.
Regardless of any factual disputes about the knowledge the police possessed concerning the
inebriation of the friends, the majority concluded that the officers did not affirmatively act
to endanger them.
92 Id. at 1015 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
9' Id. at 1014. The dissent questioned the decision, especially because of a police dispatch
that announced that a car had driven off and the driver was probably intoxicated. The
dissenting judges believed that a reasonable factfinder could conclude "that Officers Howell
and Pollock deliberately left Gregory and Fields to their own devices in Gregory's car,
recklessly disregarding the grave risk that they would injure themselves as a result of driving
while intoxicated." They continued: "[I]t was foreseeable that Gregory had the keys to his
own car," yet the police did nothing to stop them from driving away in that condition. Indeed,
the officers even told the drunks that they were "free to go." Id. at 1015. A jury might find
the facts unsympathetic, or the record might not be developed sufficiently, but the dissent
thought that Gregory should survive summary judgment. Id.
94 225 F.3d at 962.
" Id. at 962,965. Indeed, this same pedophile had previously personally called the social
services office to complain about his contact with the child being limited while she was in
state custody! Id. at 965.
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years had gone by in the safety of state custody, the majority insisted that the child's
return to her father created "no greater risk of abuse than the one that she would
have faced had she never been taken from her father in the first place. 96 The
dissenting judges, however, disagreed, arguing that such a custody transfer fell on
the other side of DeShaney's "inaction line."97 They rejected the majority's
distinction between "exposing the child to new dangers and returning her to old
ones." Rather, the dissent would have focused on whether or not the state created
the dangerous condition, in this case by handing her over from their own safe
custody to the clearly dangerous mercies of her father and his friend.99
Factual distinctions clearly can make all the difference in the world of statecreated danger claims. The Seventh Circuit's drunk-driver-replaces-designateddriver case yielded the opposite result than the Eighth Circuit reached in Gregory.
In Reed v. Gardner," the Seventh Circuit distinguished Gregory and officially
joined the expedition into the snake pit. 01' Police officers arrested the driver of a
car, leaving behind the keys and an allegedly clearly intoxicated passenger, who
then took the wheel in the stead of the sober driver.' 0 2 Two hours later the
substitute driver, who was being pursued at high speed by a deputy sheriff, caused
a head-on collision which decimated a family of innocent bystanders. 13 These facts
were enough for a snake-pit claim. While "[police officers who remove sober
drivers and leave behind drunk passengers with keys may be said to create a danger
or at least render others on the road more vulnerable,""' change the facts and you
change the results: Swapping one drunk driver for another who was also intoxicated; or failing to remove the first drunk driver; or leaving behind an apparently
sober adult, would not trigger liability." 5 The Seventh Circuit emphasized that the
police have no responsibility to maximize road safety by searching for extra keys
or ferrying stranded passengers who may be inconvenienced, but who are not in a
place of danger." Only by recklessly removing a safe driver and leaving the car
keys with the dangerously intoxicated passenger, did the police cross the
07
constitutional line.'
96 Id. at 963.

' Id. at 967 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 968.
99Id.
00 986 F.2d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 947 (1993).
101 Id. at 1125.
2

Id. at 1124.

'03 Id. at 1123-24.
'o Id. at 1125.
1I5 Id. at 1127.
106 id.
"o Id. Although the police have only limited responsibilities to protect others from
drunken drivers under the Fourteenth Amendment, ironically, the Supreme Court affords the
societal problem of driving under the influence constitutional significance under the Fourth
1180
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Changing the facts changes the results in other contexts as well. For example,
police informants who became victims fared differently even in the same circuit.
On the one hand, a paid informant for a drug squad, who was shot and seriously
wounded after he was endangered by being seen in the company of police officers,
failed to state a claim." 8 The Seventh Circuit was unsympathetic to Dykema, a man
who was experienced in drug transactions, who could quit at any time, and who
knew the dangers his cooperation might bring. ,9 Consequently, the drug task force
was not responsible if another criminal shot him."'
An anonymous informant, however, merited more sympathy from a jury and
from the Seventh Circuit on appeal. Monfils v. Taylor..1 is unusual because instead
of the more typical posture of an appeal from a successful motion to dismiss or a
motion for summary judgment, this was a decision upholding part of a jury
verdict." 2' Indeed, the decision was doubly strange, because the court declined to
send the case back for a new jury decision, even though it reversed the verdict
against the City, and technically, nojury question specifically asked about the Chief

Amendment. In Mich. Dep 't. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), the Court ruled that
the "special needs" doctrine applies to police sobriety checkpoints. Id. at 449-50. As a result,
the ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis is displaced by a balancing test which weighs the
governmental need for the intrusion against the degree of intrusion on the citizen. Id. at 449.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court contended:
No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving
problem or the States' interest in eradicating it. Media reports of
alcohol-related death and mutilation on the Nation's roads are legion.
The anecdotal is confinmed by the statistical. "Drunk drivers cause an
annual death toll of 25,000 and in the same time span cause nearly
one million personal injuries and more than five billion dollars in
property damage." For decades, this Court has "repeatedly lamented
the tragedy."
Id. at 451 (citations and footnotes omitted).
To the extent that the dreadful statistics improved in the 1980s, the Court attributed that
to police use of sobriety checkpoints, at which they stopped drivers randomly. Id. at 451 n.*.
Weighing the scale of the problem against what the Court considered a limited intrusion on
the Fourth Amendment, it allowed police to stop motorists without even a minimum
reasonable suspicion (much less probable cause). Id. at 455.
It is certainly ironic that society's great interest in preventing injury from drunk driving
justifies stopping motorists without reasonable suspicion, but at the same time imposes very
limited duties on police who exercise that state authority to stop a car and who then actually
find a drunken motorist. Apparently, as a matter of due process, the police are free either to
arrest the drunks, or let them drive off to the peril of themselves and others on the road.
108 Dykema v. Skoumal, 261 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir. 2001).
'09 Id. at 706.

"o Id. at 707.
"'
12

165 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 810 (1999).
Id. at 520.
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Deputy's individual liability.'13 Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit concluded that,
in effect, the jury had found the Chief Deputy responsible for a state-created
danger violation of due process through the jury's answer to the municipal
liability question.' 4
Workmates murdered the informant in Monfils after the police released a tape
of his tip regarding employee theft. Despite numerous desperate pleas to keep his
identity confidential because of his fear for his safety, and their promises to the
contrary, the police released the tape to the subject of the tip who was "crazy and
a biker type."" 5 The Seventh Circuit rejected a defense argument that this conduct
would satisfy the state-created danger requirement only if the police also cut off the
victim from all other avenues of self-help. 16 Instead, it reaffirmed that the issue
was "what actions did the.., officials affirmatively take, and what dangers would
[the victim] otherwise have faced?"" 7
By contrast to its unusual ruling in Monfils, however, the Seventh Circuit rarely
found the requisite "affirmative act" which magically invoked the Due Process
Clause under the state-created danger doctrine." ' In the original home of the snake
"'

Id. at 518.

"4

Id. at 519-20.

"5

Id. at 515 (quoting plaintiff).

116Id. at 517.

Id. (quoting Wallace v. Adkins, 115 F.3d 427, 430 (7th Cit. 1997)). By contrast, the
Eighth Circuit showed little constitutional sympathy for a cooperating witness who was
murdered by gang members. Prison authorities had released a letter that jeopardized the life
of the former gang member who had become a cooperating witness. See Gatlin v. Green, 362
F.3d 1089 (8th Cir. 2004). The court wrote:
Gatlin made a courageous decision to leave the MC gang, to cooperate
with police, and to start a new life. By cooperating with police in
exchange for a reduced sentence and a chance to relocate, Gatlin
knowingly assumed a considerable risk that MC gang members would
eventually discover his cooperation and seek to avenge him. Gatlin was
a twenty-five year MC gang veteran. He could evaluate better than
anyone the deadly risk inherent in cooperating with police.
Id. at 1093. The police apparently provided Gatlin with the means to hide in another
jurisdiction, but he was killed on home ground. Id.
"l' Students, for example, lost their state-created danger arguments routinely. In Martin
v. Shawano-GreshamSch. Dist., 295 F.3d 701 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,537 U.S. 1047 (2002),
a thirteen-year-old suspended from school for possessing cigarettes, was sent home in the
middle of the school day, where she committed suicide. Id. at 704. The court of appeals held
that the suspension was not an affirmative action which caused or increased the danger to the
already fragile girl, even if school officials knew about the risk that she faced. Id.at 710. The
no-duty rule even extended to state actors who failed to prevent a sexual assault on a disabled
residential student because they merely did nothing in the face of knowledge of the assaults!
Stevens v. Umsted, 131 F.3d 697, 704-06 (7th Cit. 1997). Even callously failing to punish
the perpetrators of sexual orientation harassment was not enough to lift a claim from the
inaction/no action to the creating a risk of harm or exacerbating it/action level. Nabozny v.
17

1182

2005]

SAFARI INTO THE SNAKE PIT

pit, the court reiterated how limited a caveat this doctrine was. The starting point,
of course, was the Bowers and DeShaney theme of "negative" versus "positive
liberties."119 Judge Posner elaborated the theory further in a later case involving
foster children. 2 ° Claims for "positive" constitutional liberties, as in DeShaney,
will fail, he wrote.' On the other hand, sometimes the state becomes "a doer of
harm rather than merely an inept rescuer, just as the Roman state was a doer of
harm when it threw Christians to lions.' 22 Then, the claim becomes one of
"negative liberties" which are constitutionally guaranteed against infringement.23
The Due Process Clause does not command the state to act in the face of even the
most obvious and easily avertable harm or in light of its own promises. Mere
inaction is not actionable. But, Judge Posner argued, "[t]he state, having saved a
man from a lynch mob, cannot then lynch him, on the ground that he will be no
24
worse off than if he had not been saved."'1
As a number of circuits adopted the state-created danger doctrine before 1996,
they struggled with a kind of constitutional causation. They operated on the
assumption that even the most callous "inaction" in the face of danger does not
"cause" the harm. After all, the Constitution does not guarantee anyone governmental aid. However, as the Seventh Circuit first noted many years before
DeShaney, and the courts of appeals repeated many times in state-created danger
cases following DeShaney, "the line between action and inaction, between inflicting
and failing to prevent the infliction of harm,"' 25 is not always clear:
If the state puts a man in a position of danger from private
persons and then fails to protect him, it will not be heard to say
Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 459-60 (7th Cir. 1996). Police who caught the details of sexual abuse
of a student by a teacher on their police scanner were not obligated to act either. Windle v.
City of Marion, 321 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 873 (2003).
Victims of domestic violence and a workplace shooting also failed in their state-created
danger claims in the Seventh Circuit. In Hernandezv. City of Goshen, 324 F.3d 535, 539 (7th
Cir. 2003), city police failed to investigate a call reporting a threat of violence to employees.
The court concluded that the city police neither created nor increased the danger to Plaintiff
employees by deciding not to investigate. Id. at 539. In Losinski v. County of Trempealeau,
946 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1991), a deputy sheriff failed to protect a woman from the violence
of her husband who shot and killed her in the officer's presence when the deputy
accompanied her to trailer home to get her possessions; the State did not create danger or
force her to encounter it, although the "issue [was] very close." Id. at 547-48, 550.
...See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
120 K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990).
121 Id. at 848-49.
122 Id. at 849.
123 Id. at 848.
114 Id. at 849.
125 Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (1982).
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The difficulty inhered in finding the right set of facts that crossed the line and
transformed a passive observer into an active participant who fairly could be said
to have "caused" the peril.
IV.THE MAP-MAKERS: THE CIRCUITS DEVELOP TESTS AFTER 1996

By 1996, eight circuits had recognized the state-created danger exception to
DeShaney's no responsibility rule.' 27 Virtually contemporaneously, in 1995 and
1996, two circuits formulated multi-part versions of the state-created danger theory,
thereby drawing their own road maps. 28 These tests, of course, showcased the
essential constitutionalrequirement of affirmative causation that is at the heart of
the state-created danger doctrine. Strangely, however, they also seemed to contain
elements reminiscent of pre-DeShaney tort-law derived "special relationships" and
of ordinary proximate cause.
The Third Circuit adopted the state-created danger doctrine in 1996, in Kneipp
v. Tedder, a case involving a highly inebriated woman whom the police stopped and
separated from her husband. 129 After the drunk and staggering woman was alone,
the police sent her on her way in the cold, whereupon she fell down an embankment
in the dark, ultimately suffering exposure, hypothermia, and brain damage. 3 Her
case survived in the Third Circuit. In its roadmap to the snake pit, adopted in
Kneipp, the court of appeals relied on "four common elements":
(1)the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct;
(2) the state actor acted in willful disregard for the safety of the
plaintiff; (3) there existed some relationship between the state
126

id.

"" See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1205 (3d Cir. 1996); Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d
567, 572 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1118 (1996); Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d
1169, 1175 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 994 (1995); Reed v. Gardner, 986
F.2d 1122,1125 (7th Cir.), cert.denied, 510U.S.947 (1993); Dwares v. City of New York,
985 F.2d 94, 98-99 (2d Cir. 1993); Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 54-55 (8th Cir.
1990); Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348, 356 (lth Cir. 1989), cert.
denied,494 U.S. 1066 (1990), andoverruledon othergrounds,White v. Lemacks, 183 F.3d
1253 (11 th Cir. 1999); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 590 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,

498 U.S. 938 (1990).
128 Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1208 (finding four "common elements" in doctrine); Uhlrig, 64
F.3d at 574 (adopting five-part formulation of state-created danger).
"9 95 F.3d at 1201.
130 Id. at 1203.
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and the plaintiff; (4) the state actors used their authority to
create an opportunity that otherwise would not have existed for
the third party's crime to occur.' 3 '

The Tenth Circuit had recognized the doctrine in the 1995 case, UhIrig v.
Harder.'32 Uhlrig was an unsuccessful claim on behalf of a therapist in a state
mental hospital, who was murdered on the job after the elimination of a special unit
for the criminally insane and the resulting transfer of the perpetrator into the
general hospital population. 3 3 The Tenth Circuit's roadmap included five
"concepts" necessary to establish a state-created danger claim:
[The p]laintiff must demonstrate that (1) [the victim] was a
member of a limited and specifically definable group; (2)
Defendants' conduct put [the victim] and the other members
of that group at substantial risk of serious, immediate and
proximate harm; (3) the risk was obvious or known; (4)
Defendants acted recklessly in conscious disregard of that risk;
and (5) such conduct, when viewed in total, is conscience
134
shocking.
There are two truisms in the law of § 1983:3' The first is that the statute must
"be read against the background of tort liability that makes [someone] responsible
for the natural consequences of his [or her] actions. 1 36 The second proposition,
137
however, is that § 1983 does not make the Constitution into a font of tort law.
The Third and Tenth Circuit "tests" should be deconstructed with the above
precepts in mind.
For example, in Kneipp, the Third Circuit described the "relationship" of the
police to the inebriated woman (the test's third "common element") as one in which
the officer used his power as a police officer to send her home alone in bitter
131

Id. at 1208.

132

64 F.3d 567 (10th Cir. 1995).

Id. at 570-71.
"3 Id. at 574. As recently as 2004, an Eighth Circuit case relied upon the UhIrig test to

133

reject a claim by a minor who was shot by the stepfather of the state's confidential informant.
Avalos v. City of Glenwood, 382 F.3d 792, 799 (8th Cir. 2004).
135

42 U.S.C. § 1983(2000) (creating individual liability for violation of a citizen's rights

under the Constitution and laws).
136 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (upholding cause of action against Chicago
police officers, but not against the city of Chicago, for violating plaintiffs Fourteenth
Amendment rights, under § 1979, derived from § 1 of the 1871 "Ku Klux Klan Act").
137 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701
(1976)).
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weather. 3 Described that way, this element properly reflects the constitutional
requirement that an official of the state put someone in harm's way using stategranted authority. 139 However, in subsequent cases, the court mistakenly reduced
this prong to a Martinez-like foreseeable plaintiff issue. 4 The same "foreseeable
plaintiff' element, moreover, appears in the Tenth Circuit's five-part test in Uhlrig
(i.e., that the victim must be a "member of a limited and specifically definable
group"). 4 ' Given DeShaney's repudiation of Martinez's "special relationship"
dicta,' the Third and Tenth Circuits erred in emphasizing a "foreseeable" class of
victim, because such an element does not make constitutional sense. In Martinez,
Justice Stevens opined that the parole board had no reason to suspect that the
murder victim, as distinguished from the public at large, was at risk. Furthermore,
the deadly attack was more than five months after the release of the parolee.' 43
Implicitly, this comment suggested the converse - that an assault right after the
release, visited on a predictable victim, might change the result by creating duties
through a "special relationship." Indeed, before DeShaney, a number of courts of
appeals followed the Martinez lead in deriving affirmative constitutional duties
in this manner.1" However, DeShaney repudiated that notion and made it crystal
145
clear that federal "special relationships" were strictly a function of "custody."'
Therefore, it is puzzling to see the explicitly rejected version of "special relationships" engrafted onto post-DeShaney state-created danger doctrine.
Similarly, the foreseeable and direct risk of harm criteria in the two circuits do
not seem constitutionally based. The Kneipp court's requirement that "the harm
ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct"' on the one hand echoes the
'' Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1209 (finding that the officer exercised sufficient control over the
victim to meet the relationship prong). The court's analysis, however, is somewhat undercut
by a footnote, which apparently considers the relationship element to incorporate a tort-based
foreseeable victim approach. Id. at 1290 n.22.
139See also Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 509 (3d Cir. 2003) (concluding that the
relationship test was met where, as in Kneipp, the defendants exercised sufficient control over
the plaintiff using their power as police officers).
140 See Rivas v. City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181, 197 (3d Cir. 2004) (observing that the
relationship element "contemplates a degree of contact such that the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the defendant's acts in a tort sense"); Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist.,
132 F.3d 902,906 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980), for the
"relationship" or foreseeable victim element).
".. Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 574 (10th Cir. 1995).
142 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 197 n.4 (1989).
13 Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980).
'" See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197 n.4 (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 855 F.2d
1421, 1425-26 (9th Cir. 1988)); Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 510-11
(3d Cir. 1985); Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 190-94 (4th Cir. 1984)).
145DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197-200.
'46 Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1208 (3d Cir. 1998).
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rejected constitutional reasoning of Martinez, but on the other, it is merely an
obvious statement of any tort liability. Just like Mrs. Palsgraf taught us in the first
year of law school,' 47 if any injury is too remote or attenuated, there is no legal
causation, even if the damage would not have occurred but for the initial conduct.
That clich6 applies to any claim of constitutional harm remediable through § 1983,
but it does not explain how to identify the affirmative duty that is central to statecreated danger doctrine.
The Tenth Circuit's requirement in UhIrig that the state actors put the members
of a particular group at "substantial risk of serious, immediate, and proximate
harm,"' 48 subsumes the same special relationship and proximate cause concepts
discussed above. The emphasis on members of an identifiable group at risk of "immediate and proximate harm"'49 sounds like an attempt to distinguish actionable
circumstances from the parolee in Martinez, who did not target a foreseeable plaintiff or even act until a number of months after his release. As in the Third Circuit,
this guidepost is misleading and does not mark the road to constitutional duties.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL MAP-MAKING REVISITED

In order to separate the highways from the byways en route to the snake pit, the
focus has to be on constitutional duty. As a result, properly construed, the Third
Circuit's "common element" number four ("the state actors used their authority to
create an opportunity that otherwise would not have existed for the third party's
crime to occur"), 50 is a main road, because it is but another way of saying that there
is no due process violation unless the State crosses the inaction line and affirmatively puts someone in danger. As developed since DeShaney, this constitutional
element may be broken down into its constituent parts: (1) Did state officials exercise authority or power; (2) in such a way that they put someone in a worse position
than they would otherwise have occupied?
In addition, two other constitutional elements may be teased out of the circuit
tests. In UhIrig, the Tenth Circuit suggested that in order to be actionable, the
state's conduct must produce a "substantial risk of serious, immediate, and proximate harm.''. This apparently separate component is unique to that circuit.
Rightly or wrongly included, however, it at least sounds constitutional rather than
tort-like. The last element that may be derived from the circuit tests is the state
147 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (dismissing complaint by
railroad passenger injured on platform by explosion after other passenger, who was being
helped aboard train by conductor, dropped package of fireworks).
' Uhlrig v. Harder, 65 F.3d 567, 574 (10th Cir. 1995).
149 id.

"' Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1208 (quoting Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1152

(3d Cir. 1995)).
151 Uhlrig, 64

F.3d at 574.
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of mind required to violate the substantive right. The circuits express this component differently. They may require "deliberate indifference,"'' 5 2 "willful disregard
for the safety of the plaintiff,"'' or "reckless" action in "conscious disregard of
[the] risk," that, when viewed in total, shocks the conscience.'54 In light of the
Supreme Court's 1992 and 1998 due process holdings in Collins v. City of Harker
Heights'55 and County of Sacramento v. Lewis'56 the appropriate mental state has

become a critical issue for state-created danger doctrine.
In rejecting Martinez's version of "special relationships," while preserving the
Estelle and Youngberg version of affirmative duties, the DeShaney Court in effect
affirmed that responsibilities arise under the Constitution because the State is exercising power, even if passively. Exercise of state power, therefore, should be the
salient issue, rather than any merely tort-based concern such as "knowledge" or
"foreseeability." Mixed in with the unfortunate detours, the essential elements of
the state power highway appeared on the Third Circuit's road map. The fourth
"common element" of Kneipp was that "state actors used their authority to create
an opportunity that otherwise would not have existed for the third party's crime to
'
occur."157
The Third Circuit's explanation of the "relationship between the state
and the plaintiff"5 8 prong in Kneipp, moreover, also appropriately emphasized the
fact that the police exercised power over the inebriated woman by stopping her,
separating her from her husband, and then sending her into the cruel dangers of the
night. In 2003, in Smith v. Marasco,159 the court reiterated that insight. Rather than
focusing on whether this was a foreseeable victim, as in some intervening cases,
the court of appeals opined that the "relationship between the plaintiff and the
state" requirement was met because the police officers who engaged in a stand-off,
keeping the victim in the woods, away from his home and his medicines, exerted
sufficient control over him. 160

The "state control over the plaintiff' criterion makes constitutional sense and
can be applied in other fact situations as well. For example, the Tenth Circuit case,
Armio v. Wagon Mound PublicSchools,'61 involved the suicide of a special education student. The court recognized a special danger claim in this case, which was a
152 See,

e.g., L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 122-23 (9th Cir. 1992).
1 See, e.g., Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1208 (quoting Mark, 51 F.3d at 1152).
154 See, e.g., Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 574.
155 503 U.S. 115 (1992) (§ 1983 does not provide a remedy for city employee who was
injured while working).
156

523 U.S. 833 (1998) (§ 1983 does not provide a remedy for passenger killed during

high-speed police chase).
117 95 F.3d at 1208 (quoting Mark, 51 F.3d at 152) (emphasis
added).
158Id.
159 318 F.3d 497, 509 (3d Cir. 2003).
160 Id.
161 159 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998).
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strikingly different result than the one reached in another school suicide case in the
Seventh Circuit.'62 In the Seventh Circuit case, the Martin girl was a thirteen-yearold who was suspended from school for possessing cigarettes and sent home, where
she committed suicide. 6 3 In the Tenth Circuit case, by contrast, school officials
suspended the Armijo boy, who was a special education student, and drove him to
his empty home in violation of school policy. They failed to notify his parents, and
instructed the police to detain him if he attempted to return to school.'64
Let us be very careful in making distinctions here: these cases are in two
different circuits. Moreover, I would not want to argue that they are both decided
correctly or that a high degree of state control that approaches "custody" is
necessary for state-created danger. However, there is more evidence of the exercise
of state power in the Armijo case than in Martin. State officials exercised a
significant, but not all-encompassing, degree of state authority in Armijo, which
created the danger facing the student and rendered him more vulnerable. It is a
clear conclusion to be drawn from DeShaney's rationale: the state actors may have
known about Joshua's danger, but they did not put him in danger in the first place
or render him more vulnerable to the peril. It is compatible with the original snake
pit case, in which Judge Posner explained that the line between inaction and action
is not always so easy to draw and that the state cannot put someone in a position of
danger from private persons and then refuse to protect him. Under such circumstances, the State "will not be heard to say that its role was merely passive; it is as
'
much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake pit. 165
The third element that may be teased out of the circuit tests relates to the
severity of the injury or the seriousness of the risk of harm. The Tenth Circuit
required Uhlrig to demonstrate, in addition to other criteria, that the defendants'
"conduct put [him] and the other members of that group at substantial risk of serious, immediate, and proximate harm."' 166 Setting aside the Martinez-like features
of this formulation that have been discussed above, that still leaves the questions of
whether the substantiality of the risk or the seriousness of the harm play a role in
stating a constitutional violation. If so, do they count as a separate requisite, or do
they slide into the final element - state of mind?
There is some indirect support for reasoning that the risks entailed must reach
a sufficiently serious level to trigger constitutional duties. Other claims based on
affirmative duties, in one way or another, do incorporate such a standard.
DeShaney explained that Estelle established that under the Eighth Amendment,

"' Martin v. Shawano-Gresham Sch. Dist., 295 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2002).
163 Id. at 704-05; see supra note 118.
'6' Armijo, 159 F.3d at 1257.
165 Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
'66 Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 574.
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states were obligated to provide "adequate medical care" for convicted inmates. 67
To state a claim, the prisoner had to show that the defendants exhibited deliberate
indifference to "serious medical needs."' 68 Youngberg v. Romeo extended the obligation to individuals civilly committed.' 69 The Court ruled that the Due Process
Clause imposes a responsibility on the state "to provide involuntarily committed
mental patients with such services as are necessary to ensure their 'reasonable safety' from themselves and others." 7 ' Consequently, civil committees are entitled to
"adequate food, clothing, shelter and medical care." 171 In Youngberg, the Court
did
not define the outer limits of the substantive right. It was clear, however, that the
72
interest extended at least to safety and freedom from unnecessary bodily restraint. 1
The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that due process guarantees extend
to suspects in police custody, who merit at least the same protection and medical care
as convicted prisoners. 7 3 Lower courts further assume that the deliberate indifference to "serious medical needs" standard of the Eighth Amendment is at least a
minimum guarantee in cases ofjuvenile detainees or others who are not being "punished" and, therefore, do not qualify for the Eighth Amendment standard per se.' 74
If "serious" is a constitutional modifier in these other affirmative duty cases,
arguably it might be applicable to state-created danger cases. If so, however, courts
should bear in mind the variety of harms that have been considered "serious" in
those other settings and should evaluate whether or not different constitutional
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198.
Id. at 198-99 & n.5; cf Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (recognizing that an
inmate may have a valid excessive force claim against prison guards even though the inmate
suffered only minor injuries including bruises, swelling, loosened teeth, and a cracked dental
plate). The Court ruled that excessive use of force on an inmate violates the Eighth
Amendment, even if the inmate does not actually suffer "significant" injury (as the Fifth
Circuit had required). The Court explained that the degree of the injury might signify how
unnecessary and wanton the excessive force was, but that it is not a separate objective
requirement. The Court's Eighth Amendment reasoning was that the malicious infliction of
pain will always violate contemporary standards of decency, although every push or shove
inside prison will not give rise to a federal cause of action. Id. at 9. In Justice Blackmun's
concurrence, he criticized the argument made by the Attomeys-General of a number of states,
including Texas, that the serious injury requirement was necessary to curb prison lawsuits.
Id. at 15 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("This audacious approach to the Eighth Amendment
assumes that the interpretation of an explicit constitutional protection is to be guided by pure
policy preferences for the paring down of prisoner petitions.").
169 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
170 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199 (discussing the Court's holding in Youngberg).
171 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315.
172 Id. at 316-19.
113City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983).
114See, e.g., A.M. v. Luzerne County Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 2004)
(juvenile detention center); Barrie v. Grand County, Utah, 119 F.3d 862 (10th Cir. 1997)
(pretrial detainee).
167

168
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bases make a difference. For example, the Eighth Amendment prohibits deliberate
indifference to serious known medical needs. Courts have found a variety of harms
to constitute "serious medical needs": for example, asthma with intermittent
breathing problems, coughing, wheezing, and hyperventilating; a leg injury which
was deteriorating, caused pain, and made it difficult to walk; and a one-and-a-half
inch cut over the eye which had been allowed to bleed unattended for over two
hours.'75 On the other hand, "pseudofolliculitis," which is aggravated by the
prison's shaving requirement, does not rise to the level of serious medical need;
nor does moderately high blood pressure or an old shoulder injury that does not
affect the inmate's range of motion.'
In a 1993 case, Helling v. McKinney,' the Supreme Court was asked to rule on
an inmate's secondhand smoke exposure claim under the Eighth Amendment. The
Court held that it was not necessary to wait for a tragic incident to occur if there
was sufficient likelihood of its eventual occurrence or of its magnitude. 7 ' In other
words, the "serious" medical need did not have to be a current one, and therefore,
exposure to a five-pack a day cigarette smoker might suffice. 7 9 Prison officials

were not free to ignore evidence of something that might not be a medical problem
now, but was likely to produce one in the future.18°
The Helling Court also explained how the nature of the Eighth Amendment
guarantee shaped the seriousness inquiry. The Eighth Amendment contains an
objective component that asks whether the conditions of confinement offend contemporary standards of decency. Answering the objective question requires a twofold inquiry. First, how serious was the potential harm and the likelihood that the
smoke exposure would produce it? Second, does society consider the risk so grave
that a decent community would never expose anyone unwillingly to it?' 8 ' In other
words, because the Eighth Amendment is all about contemporary standards of
decency, "seriousness" is judged both factually and in the context of what society
believes is an acceptable or unacceptable "punishment."
Many of the state-created danger cases involve serious harms, such as death in
a standoff that blocked access to help and medicines, 82 suicide,' 83 brain damage

175 See Farrow

v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 & n.14 (1 lth Cir. 2003) (collecting cases).

176 Id.; cf. Smith

v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2003) (directing the jury to focus on

the harm from the brief interruption in HIV medicine, and not on the seriousness of the underlying HIV condition itself).
77 509 U.S. 25 (1993).
178 Id. at 34.
9

Id. at 35.

181 Id. at 33.
181 Id. at 35.
182
183

Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 509 (3d Cir. 2003).
Armijo v. Wagon Mound Pub. Sch., 159 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998).
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from exposure,' rape in a high crime neighborhood,' 5 murder by an estranged
husband whose police buddies were directed not to interfere,"8 6 and severe injury
in an automobile collision with a drunk driver.187 The snake pit language itself
carries the overtone of risk of significant harm.
On the other hand, death or severe injury should not be an absolute prerequisite
for state-created danger. White v. Rochford,'88 an archetypical and influential early
case, involved serious injury to children whom police abandoned when they arrested
and removed their uncle from his car.'89 No one should have to endure such trauma
before state officials are held accountable for throwing them into the snake pit. The
degree of control exerted by the state also should count if seriousness is to be
weighed. Constitutional duties should balance against state power. Logically, a
degree of control which approaches Estelle and Youngberg should trigger a broader
right to protection from third party harm than one where the state's authority is less
encompassing. In other words, the greater the state control, the broader the state
responsibility, even for less serious risks and injuries.
VI. NAVIGATING THE ROUTE IN THE RIGHT FRAME OF MIND: STATE OF MIND
AND THE CONSTITUTION

Ever since the Court recognized the dilemma created by its 1981 ruling in
Parrattv. Taylor,"9 it has been groping for an adequate state-of-mind requirement
in cases involving the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Parratt
created a state-of-mind problem because it did not effectively satisfy the need to
prevent the Constitution from becoming a "font of tort law." Prison officials in
Parrattmisplaced an inmate's hobby kit, which arrived while he was in administrative segregation.' 9 ' The Court held that the claimant was "deprived" of a
"

Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199 (3d Cir. 1996).

185 Wood v Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989).

Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1990).
Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1993).
"81592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
189 See supra notes 62--64 and accompanying text. There was physical as well as
186

187

psychological harm to the children in Rochford. The Tenth Circuit decided a case in which
the allegations were of psychological harm alone. See Abeyta v. Chama Valley Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 19, 77 F.3d 1253, 1254 (10th Cir. 1996) (twelve-year-old alleging harm from
teacher calling student "a prostitute" over period of weeks in front of class). The court held
that the teacher had not created a hostile environment that was severe enough to constitute
a substantive due process violation. Although not ruling the possibility out, it questioned
whether even extreme verbal harassment could ever be severe enough to shock the
conscience. Id. at 1257-58. The Abeyta opinion noted that Rochford conceded it might be
a closer question if the only harm to the children was psychological. Abeyta, 77 F.3d at 1257.
'90 451 U.S. 526 (1981).
191 Id. at 530.
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"property interest" in the hobby kit "under color of state law" within the meaning
of § 1983.9 The Court found that the federal statutory remedy incorporated no
state-of-mind requirement at all.'93 Without more, this holding raised the specter
that any tort committed by a state official would become a federal case. The
Court's solution was to rule that when the loss was inflicted by "random and
unauthorized" conduct, procedural due process could be satisfied by a postdeprivation remedy.' 94 The existence of an "adequate state remedy," typically state
tort law, therefore was expected to cut off the kind of trivial, ordinary tort law
claims that threatened to turn the Constitution into a font of tort law. 195
Justice Powell warned in his concurrence, however, that the Court was making
a mistake. 9" Many states limited their waivers of sovereign tort immunity and
therefore would not offer an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Under such circumstances, the Court's solution would fail to prevent ordinary torts committed by state
actors from becoming due process complaints.'97 Instead of what he saw as a
narrow procedural approach, Justice Powell would have ruled that a negligent deprivation of a property interest does not "work[] a deprivation in the constitutional
sense."' 98 He explained that every constitutional provision contains its own stateof-mind requirement, regardless of the absence of any such element in the statutory
remedy for violations of federal rights. The Due Process Clause simply could not
be violated by mere negligence. 9
Justice Powell's warning proved to be prophetic. As a result, a mere five years
later, when the Court heard two cases in which there were no adequate state
remedies for deprivations of liberty interests, it decided that the proper way to
control the flood of prison litigation was by following Powell's advice. In Daniels
v. Williams200 and Davidson v. Cannon,20 1 the Court held that negligent acts could
never violate the Due Process Clause, either in its procedural or in its substantive

192

Id at 536-37.

Id.at 534.
Id. at 541-42.
19' In subsequent cases, the "adequate state remedy" doctrine was clearly limited to
procedural due process only, although it applied equally to intentional or other deprivations
of either liberty or property. See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (adequate
state remedy doctrine not applicable to substantive claims); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517
(1984) (intentional deprivation of property).
196 Parratt,451 U.S. at 546 (Powell, J., concurring).
197Id.at 550-51 (Powell, J., concurring).
'98 Id.at 548.
193
194

199 Id.

200 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (upholding summaryjudgment in an inmate's due process action
for slip and fall on pillow in prison stairway).
20 474 U.S. 344 (1986) (denying recovery to inmate whose due process complaint was
based on failure to prevent assault by other inmates).
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aspect.2" 2 The Court, however, left unsettled the issue of just what state of mind
beyond negligence, but perhaps less than intent, might state a claim under this
constitutional provision.20 3
The state-created danger cases arose after 1986 in this unsettled environment.
In 1989, DeShaney explained its philosophy of the limited scope of "affirmative
duties" in general. The analysis provided a basis for assuming that like "special
relationship" (custodial) cases, state-created danger claims would not prevail unless
they established "deliberate indifference" at a minimum. At virtually the same time,
moreover, the Court decided a § 1983 municipal liability case, City of Canton v.
Harriswhich adopted the "deliberate indifference" standard in a different context,
albeit one involving inaction as well.2 o4 Inevitably, this coincidence influenced the
substantive analysis too. Two more Supreme Court cases followed that further
shaped the state-created danger state-of-mind discussion in the circuits. Collins v.
HarkerHeights205 in 1992, and especially County of Sacramentov. Lewis 206 in 1998,
raised the substantive due process ante by dismissing claims of deliberate indifference where the conduct was not arbitrary and "conscience-shocking" as well.20 7
In narrowing the "special relationship" brand of affirmative duties to a question
of custody, the DeShaney Court implicitly embraced the "deliberate indifference"
standard of Estelle.20 8 Because the case turned on the majority's finding that there
was no affirmative duty to Joshua at all, however, there was no need to address the
question of the appropriate state of mind.2 9 Within a week, the Court issued an
opinion on another issue that nonetheless thereafter influenced state-created danger
cases. City of Canton v. Harris was a § 1983 municipal liability case.210 The
plaintiffs sought to hold the city responsible for failing to train its jail officers to
202
203

Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328; Davidson,474 U.S. at 348.
Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334 n.3 (acknowledging that the Court had no occasion to rule on

whether something less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or "gross negligence"
will trigger due process protections); see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833
(1998). The Court decided that for high-speed police chases only an intent to injure would
sufficiently shock the conscience and state a substantive due process violation. However, the
opinion also admonished courts to evaluate each different context separately for the requisite
culpability that shocks the conscience. Id. at 850-51.
204
205
206
207

489 U.S. 378 (1989).

503 U.S. 115 (1992).
523 U.S. 833 (1998).
For cases that followed, see, for example, Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492,

510 (6th Cir. 2002); Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637,651 (D.C. Cir. 2001); S.S.
v. McMullen, 225 F.3d 960, 964 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc); White v. Lemacks, 183 F.3d
1253, 1258 (1 th Cir. 1999); Armijo v. Wagon Mound Pub. Sch., 159 F.3d 1253, 1262 (10th
Cir. 1998).
208 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198 & n.5 (1989).
209 Id. at 202 n.10.
210 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
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evaluate an arrestee's need for medical attention."' In Harris,jail officials failed
to obtain medical assistance for an incoherent and slumping arrestee. When released, she was taken by an ambulance, provided by her family, to a hospital where
she was diagnosed as suffering from severe emotional problems and where she
remained in treatment for one week.2" 2 Clearly, the arrestee possessed the underlying constitutional right to treatment for known serious medical needs. 1 3 At the
Supreme Court level, however, this was a purely statutory case, which raised the
issue of under what circumstances could the municipal defendant be held liable
for its inaction in failing to train its officers to recognize a medical problem."1 4
Although unlike DeShaney, Harrisraised no questions about the nature and content
of the Due Process Clause, it shared a feature with the former case because it was
about inaction. This was not a question of municipal action, for example, where the
city had a "custom or policy" of denying teachers the right to their jobs after the
fifth month of their pregnancy,215 or of authorizing its agents to break into a doctor's
back office in order to serve capiases." 6 Rather, this was an inaction situation in
which the city had allegedly failed to train its officers, thereby causing them to
violate the constitutional right to medical treatment while in custody.
The HarrisCourt concluded that it was possible to base municipal liability on
a "failure to train," but only under limited circumstances.2" 7 It held "that the
inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where
the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with
whom the police come into contact."2
The deliberate indifference standard
represented a safeguard against too easily finding municipal liability under a statute
that had been interpreted to impose liability only if the city was the "moving force"
behind the violation.1 9 In order to preserve that principle, the Court decided to
require that municipal decision makers actually made a deliberate or conscious
"choice" not to train their agents. The Court observed that this standard had
nothing to do with "the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make
out an underlying claim of a constitutional violation., 220 The requisite deliberate
indifference would not be easy to find. No liability attached to the city, unless "in
211
212

213

Id. at 382.
Id. at 381.
See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 243-45 (1983) (recognizing

that a detainee has right to medical care under Due Process Clause which is at least equivalent to the rights of convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment).
214 Harris,489 U.S. at 389.
211 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
216 Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
217 Harris,489 U.S. at 387.
218 Id. at 388.
219 Id. at 389.
220 Id. at 388 n.8.
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light of the duties assigned . . . the need for more or different training is so
obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional
rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been
deliberately indifferent to the need," and the lack of training also actually causes
injury."' The majority emphasized the need for high standards for fault and
causation, for fear that otherwise municipal liability would skyrocket. 222
Although not a constitutional content case, Harrisinevitably fed the unease
about "inaction" claims and promoted the notion that requiring high degrees of fault
and causation might be a solution.223 When the Court did address substantive rights,
it found that even the allegation of "deliberate indifference" may not by itself state
a constitutional claim in all circumstances. In Collins v. City of HarkerHeights a
city employee died from sewer gases after he was ordered to enter the line to unstop
it.224 The Court interpreted his survivor's suit to allege either that the city had a
constitutional duty to provide its employees with a safe working environment, or
that "the city's 'deliberate indifference' to [the employee' s] safety was arbitrary
government action that must 'shock the conscience' of federal judges."'2' The
Court emphatically rejected these contentions, concluding that the duty to protect
in prior cases grew out of DeShaney-type obligations to those whom the state had
deprived of their liberty, such as pretrial detainees, mental institution patients,
convicted felons, or persons under arrest. By contrast, an employee who voluntarily
accepted work from the city was not in the same situation. Furthermore, any
omission to warn or train resembled a state tort claim rather than an arbitrary or
conscience-shocking constitutional violation. 6 Collins influenced subsequent
state-created danger cases, overlaying deliberate indifference with additional
requirements smacking of egregiousness and arbitrariness.227
Id. at 390. The example offered implied a tough standard: city policymakers who
"know to a moral certainty that their police officers will be required to arrest fleeing felons,"
and who provide them with firearms to do this job, must train the officers in the use of those
weapons. Id. at 390 n.10.
222 Id. at 391-92.
223 See, e.g., Brown v. Pa. Dep't of Health Emergency Med. Serv. Training Inst., 318 F.3d
473,479 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing both constitutional and municipal liability decisions for their
constitutional conclusion about state of mind). Wood v. Ostrander,879 F.2d 583, 588 (9th
Cir. 1989), noted that Harrisexpressly reserved the question of minimum state of mind for
the underlying constitutional violation. Nonetheless, the court found that the municipal
liability decision "calls into question our statements ... that a showing of gross negligence
will suffice to establish the requisite level of fault in a section 1983 action against an
individual state actor." Id. (emphasis added).
224 503 U.S. 115 (1992).
225 id. at 126.
226 Id. at 126-28.
227 See, e.g., Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567,573 (10th Cir. 1995) (concluding that Collins
underscores that a substantive due process violation must be more than an ordinary tort);
221
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The Court ratcheted up the state-of-mind stakes still further in a police chase
decision, County ofSacramento v. Lewis. 22' A sixteen-year-old boy was killed when
he was thrown from the passenger seat of a motorcycle leading the police on a highspeed chase through residential neighborhoods. A police car hit him while still
traveling at a speed of forty miles-per-hour. His parents and his estate brought a
substantive due process claim, alleging that the boy had been deprived of his right to
life. 229 The Ninth Circuit held that "deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard
for, a person's right to life and personal security" was enough to state this claim, but
the Supreme Court reversed. 3 0 The Court emphasized that due process was mostly
a guarantee against arbitrary and abusive government power.23' Justice Souter explained that ever since Rochin v. California,232 "we have spoken of the cognizable
level of executive abuse of power as that which shocks the conscience. ' 233 This admittedly imprecise standard was not subject to "mechanical application. 2 34 In fact,
"[d]eliberate indifference that shocks in one environment may not be so patently
egregious in another. '231 Justice Souter was not prepared to say whether something
more than negligence, but less than intentional conduct, "such as recklessness or
gross negligence" can ever reach the "point of conscience-shocking. '23 6 Therefore,

the Court held that the circumstances must be analyzed before deciding whether
there was a due process violation. Each situation is different, such as with a custodial prisoner, mental patient, or in a prison riot; accordingly, the conduct that rises
to the level of conscience-shocking will vary.237 In this police chase scenario, the
Court granted extreme latitude to state officials. Under these difficult circumstances, which demanded split-second decision making, just as in prison riots, the
police did not violate substantive due process through conscience-shocking conduct
unless they were motivated by an actual purpose to do harm.238
Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1303 (3d Cir. 1994) (re-examining the Court's
deliberate indifference standard in light of Collins,and finding that the conduct must shock
the conscience).
228 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
229 Id. at 836-37.
230 Id. at 838-40.
231 Id. at 845-46.
232 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
233 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846.
234 Id. at 850.
235 id.
236 Id. at 849.
237 Id. at 850-5 1.
238 Id. at 853-54. Contrast the results in Lewis to Tennessee v. Garner,471 U.S. 1 (1985).
In Gamer, police officers shot an unarmed teenager who was fleeing a burglary of an
unoccupied house. Garner,471 U.S. at 3-4. The Court held that the shooting was a "seizure"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 7. Consequently, it applied the Fourth

Amendment "reasonableness standard" and found that, under these circumstances, the use
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The state-created danger cases drew two lessons from Lewis. Although the
courts did not conclude that the police chase standard (intent to do harm) applied
in other situations, the courts overlaid "shocks the conscience" onto existing tests.
At the same time, they also took note of Justice Souter's observation that what
shocks the conscience in one context, does not necessarily shock it in another.239
Souter conceded in Lewis that "the measure of what is conscience-shocking is no

of force to stop the fleeing suspect was unreasonable:
This case requires us to determine the constitutionality of the use of
deadly force to prevent the escape of an apparently unarmed suspected
felon. We conclude that such force may not be used unless it is
necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to
believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious
physical injury to the officer or others.
Id. at 3.

In light of the Court's stated preference for a more particularized constitutional provision
over a generic due process claim, see Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989), the

"seizure" argument was raised in Lewis, but to no avail. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 842-43. The
Lewis Court found that there is a Fourth Amendment seizure only when there is "a govern-

mental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied." id. at

844. Shooting to stop a fleeing suspect on foot is a "seizure," but crashing into a fleeing car,
or the passenger on a motorcycle, thus effectively stopping them, is not. Even "deliberate
or reckless indifference to life in a high-speed automobile chase aimed at apprehending a
suspected offender" will not satisfy the heightened substantive due process standard of intent
to injure. Id. at 836. As a result, the passenger in Lewis had no remedy for death by a wild
police chase.
In a variation on the themes of automobiles and shootings, a newspaper analysis of
citizen deaths and injuries in shootings in Harris County, Texas, revealed that deputies shot
twenty-two shoplifters, speeders, innocent people, and others "by firing on vehicles in
violation of the deputies' own training." Lise Olsen & Roma Khanna, Deputies Shot 22 in
Cars from '99 to '04, Hous. CHRON., June 6, 2004, at A1, available at LEXIS, News
Library. In at least seven of the cases, "the deputies deliberately placed themselves in danger
by stepping in front of a suspect's car or truck and then firing in self-defense." Id. The
investigation also showed that deputies frequently fired after deliberately blocking the paths
of cars whose drivers had committed minor property crimes, such as stealing from parked
cars. Id. Three shootings involving more serious crimes involved authorization to end a
police chase with the use of lethal force. Id. Even by the flawed reasoning of Lewis, these
automobile-related shootings should be evaluated under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness test, rather than the Fourteenth's "shock the conscience" standard.
239 See, e.g., Rivas v. City of Passaic, 355 F.3d 181, 202-03 (3d Cir. 2004) (Ambro, J.,
concurring in part) (reevaluating the Kneipp state-created danger test in light of Lewis);
Waddell v. Hendry County Sheriffs Office, 329 F.3d 1300, 1305-06 (11th Cir. 2003)
(observing that a plaintiff injured in a non-custodial setting must show deliberate indifference at the very least although it may not be conscience-shocking enough); S.S. v. McMullen,
225 F.3d 960, 964 (8th Cir. 2000) (surmising that deliberate indifference may shock the
conscience in some situations, but not under these circumstances).
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calibrated yard stick., 24 While only a level of behavior that was egregious and
outrageous, "shocks the conscience," everything depended on context: "Deliberate
indifference that shocks in one environment may not be so patently egregious in
another, and our concern with preserving the constitutional proportions of substantive due process demands an exact analysis of circumstances before any abuse
of power is condemned as conscience-shocking.""2 This particularized analysis led
the Court in Lewis to conclude that deliberate indifference was an adequate standard
for failure to protect someone in custody, but that a prison riot or a high-speed
police chase required heightened degrees of culpability.242
At its extreme, the Lewis holding virtually cut off state-created danger claims
arising out of police chases. In 2001, the Eighth Circuit decided Helseth v. Burch,243
a case in which innocent bystanders were killed by a drunken driver fleeing in an extended police chase. Several squad cars pursued at a speed of eighty to one-hundred
miles-per-hour, over an extended time and route, until the drunken driver crashed
into the truck of a third party, leaving one passenger dead and rendering the truck's
driver a quadriplegic, while seriously injuring three juveniles in the pursued car.2 44
Helseth revolved entirely around "the proper culpability standard. ' 245 It overruled a distinction that an earlier panel decision made between types of high-speed
police chases. 46 In Lewis, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of giving
maximum latitude to police officers in an emergency situation where they had no
opportunity to actually "deliberate" before making a decision to engage in a chase.
The Eighth Circuit in Feist v. Simonson had seized on this rationale to make a distinction between sudden chases, where there was no opportunity to "deliberate" and
situations in which the pursuit goes on long enough that there should be some opportunity to reflect about the risks entailed.247 Sitting en banc, however, the court of
appeals reconciled all police chases under a single standard. Helseth's gloss on
Lewis was that the intent-to-injure standard applied regardless of any other factor,
such as "the length of the pursuit, the officer's training and experience, the severity
of the suspect's misconduct, or the perceived danger to the public in continuing the
pursuit.',24
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847.
Id. at 850.
242 Id. at 852-54.
243 258 F.3d 867 (8th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
244 Id. at 869.
245 Id. at 870.
246 Id. at 869 (overruling Feist v. Simonson, 222 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2000)).
247 Feist, 222 F.3d at 462-63 (rejecting defendant's argument that the intent-to-harm
standard applied because deliberate indifference is sufficient when actual deliberation is
practical).
248 Helseth, 258 F.3d at 870-71 (collecting cases). An ever-dwindling number of
dissenting judges disagree with the proposition that Lewis adopted a per se police chase rule.
See, e.g., id. at 873 (McMillan, J. dissenting).
'40

241
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Helseth demonstrates how culpability can become the single determinant of a
state-created danger case. Based on Justice Souter's admonitions about variability,
however, Lewis does not transform the danger doctrine entirely. Outside of the
emergent police chase (or ordinary workplace safety), the analysis properly centers
on the constitutional heart of the theory. That core is located in the question of
whether the defendant has used the authority of the state to put someone in a worse
position than they otherwise would occupy, and consequently owes them an affirmative duty of protection. It is true that like any other provision of the Constitution,
the Due Process Clause incorporates its own state-of-mind requirement. The Court,
moreover, clearly intends to limit protection even from conduct animated by deliberate indifference to circumstances where the government action can be said to be
arbitrary and therefore conscience-shocking. The rhetorical point is that the cause
of action is to be saved for truly egregious trips into the snake pit; however, this
should not be taken as an excuse to reduce further the narrow applications of an
already stingy doctrine.
VII. SPECIAL PROBLEMS: QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

Like all constitutional claims, state-created danger due process actions must be
brought through the § 1983 remedy. While the underlying constitutional violation
must be established to prevail, in addition, the statute has its own elements. For
example, individual officials enjoy a defense of "qualified immunity" that the Court
has read into the statute.249 This defense protects officials from liability, and even
from litigation, unless they violate a law that was "clearly-established" at the time
of their conduct."' Municipalities, on the other hand, cannot claim any such
immunity defense. 5 ' However, they are not liable simply because they employ a
constitutional tortfeasor; instead, government "policy or custom" must be the
"moving force" behind the constitutional violation.252 This is not easy to establish,
especially when the claim is based on governmental "inaction" rather than "action."
State-created danger cases raise difficult questions for the defense of qualified
immunity and for the proof of municipal liability. In particular, this Article focuses
on two special problems: (1) the effect of changing constitutional standards on the
qualified immunity defense; and (2) the significance of disparate liability findings
for the city and its officials.
249

See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967) (presuming Congress did not mean

to abolish common law immunity defenses when it enacted § 1983). See generally Laura
Oren, Immunity andAccountability in Civil Rights Litigation:Who Should Pay?,50 U. Prrr.
L. Rav. 935 (1989) (noting the derivation of the immunity defense in § 1983 cases).
250 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982).
251 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980) (noting that a municipality
has no immunity and may not assert the good faith of its officers as a defense).
252 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
1200
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The special problem for qualified immunity relates to the second of a two-part
analysis of that defense. Ever since Siegertv. Gilley,2" the first step is to determine
if a constitutional right has been violated at all.254 This Article has addressed that
substantive issue. 2" If the allegations do state a constitutional violation, however,
then the court continues and inquires whether such a right was "clearly established"
at the time of the conduct in question.256 As an offshoot of the latter step, the court
also determines whether a reasonable person in the state officer's position would
'
Unless a plaintiff can overhave been aware of the "clearly-established law."257
come all aspects of the defense, the official is immunized from further litigation and
from paying compensatory damages.2"'
As the courts of appeals accepted and then refined the state created danger
doctrine, the questions of just what law is "clearly-established," and when, arose.
Qualified immunity law requires that the legal principle go beyond a bare level of
generality and be established with a certain degree of specificity.2 9 On the other
hand, in Hope v. Pelzer,2 ° the Supreme Court recently admonished jurists not to
demand too much particularity or factual similarity between precedent and the case
at bar.261 Justice Stevens opined that the purpose of qualified immunity was to put
officers "on notice their conduct is unlawful. 262 This "fair warning" requirement
may be satisfied "even in novel factual circumstances."26' 3 The Supreme Court has
also rejected a version of "clearly-established law," which would depend only on
its own decisions or a controlling precedent in the same circuit in which the case

2" 500 U.S. 226 (1991).
' Id. at 232; Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
151 See supra Parts III-VI.
256 Saucier,533 U.S. at 201.
' Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,644 (1987) (requiring objective reasonableness
for qualified immunity even in Fourth Amendment "unreasonable" search case); Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 517 (1985) (explaining that the law has to be clear enough that a
reasonable officer would understand that the disputed conduct violates a right) (citing Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); id.at 818 ("[G]overnment officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly-established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.").
258 Harlow,457 U.S. at 817-18 (reasoning that officials should be able to avoid the costs
of suit and discovery if their conduct was objectively reasonable).
259 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639-40.
260 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (barring defense

of qualified immunity for prison guards who

handcuffed prisoner to hitching post).
261 Id. at 741.
262 Id. at 739 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001)).
263 Id. at 741.
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arose. Law that is supported by a consensus of the circuits also may be deemed
"clearly-established."2 64
We have seen that various courts have "refined" or added elements to
previously existing tests. For example, in 1996, the Third Circuit articulated a fourpart test for state-created danger in Kneipp v. Tedder.265 Without abandoning that
formula, the court of appeals subsequently modified some of its elements and
suggested that after Lewis, all substantive due process violations had to "shock [I
the conscience.""26 What is the effect of such shifts in doctrine on the qualified
immunity defense? Some circuits show little concern about "refinements" of the
state-created danger doctrine. The Tenth Circuit, for example, explained in Currier
v. Doran267 that its decision to deny qualified immunity to one of the defendants
would not be "altered to the extent that some of [its] pre 1995 cases can be
interpreted to not require 'conscience-shocking' behavior. '261 In part, the court of
appeals rationalized its conclusion by citing a 1992 Supreme Court case, Collins v.
Harker Heights,269 which already demanded that the conscience be shocked in a
worker safety substantive due process case. The court cited Collins as controlling
precedent and a case "on point" for the case before it.270 The court's second
justification for dismissing the defense was even more interesting: "In addition,
the shock the conscience requirement is an additional hurdle for plaintiffs
attempting to prove liability. '27' Therefore, the defendants could not claim that
they had no fair notice of a standard that was even more generous to them than
that which may have applied before the "shock the conscience" element became

See McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314,329 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per
curiam) (McClendon II), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1232 (2003) (grudgingly concluding from
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999) that the Fifth Circuit was required to consider
controlling precedent from the Supreme Court or its own circuit, but also "a consensus of
cases of persuasive authority" in applying qualified immunity to a state-created danger
lawsuit).
265 95 F.3d 1199, 1208 (3d Cir. 1996).
266 See Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 507 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that the
Third Circuit "refined the third and fourth prongs of the state-created danger test" in Morse
v. Lower Merion School District, 132 F.3d 902 (3d Cir. 1997), and the Supreme Court held
in Lewis that liability for a police chase attached only if the conduct "shocked the conscience," 523 U.S. 833, 834 (1998), a standard which Miller v. City of Philadelphia,174
F.3d 368, 374-75 (3d Cir. 1999), suggested might apply to all substantive due process cases).
267 242 F.3d 905, 924 (10th Cir. 2001).
268 Id. at 924 n.8.
269 503 U.S. 115 (1992).
270 Currier,905 F.3d at 924 n.8.
264

271

Id.

1202

20051

SAFARI INTO THE SNAKE PIT

"clearly-established. 272 In other words, defendants could not complain of a change
that worked to their advantage.
If, as this Article suggests, the courts of appeals ignore the byways and focus
on the highways along the route into the snake pit, the "fair notice" reasoning of the
Tenth Circuit should prevail. Differences that do not place a more onerous burden
on defendants do not deprive them of fair notice of the illegality of their conduct.
Therefore, defendants should not enjoy a windfall defense from the refinement of
standards that are already widely accepted in the circuits.
The second special problem concerns municipal liability and the possibility of
disparate results in proof of liability against the individual officers and the government. As in any § 1983 case, the separate municipal liability standard applied in
state-created danger scenarios may lead to disparate, but not necessarily inconsistent, results: individuals may be liable, but there is no proof that the city was
the "moving force" behind the violation; or the municipality may be liable, while
the officials are shielded by qualified immunity. Because the standard for municipal liability is so difficult, it is not surprising that a city may escape liability even
though the individual officers are found guilty. For example, Monfils v. Taylor273
involved a confidential informant who was gruesomely murdered after police
officials released a tape with his voice on it to the violent subject of the tip.
Monfils's frantic calls to prevent this occurrence, and the promises made to him,
fell by the wayside as "the left hand did not know- or much care - what the right
'
hand was doing."274
The Seventh Circuit upheld a jury verdict against the deputy
who released the tape, but it found insufficient evidence that the city had "ratified"
his action.275 The court of appeals therefore nullified the municipal liability part of
76
the jury's verdict.
Kallstrom v. City of Columbus,277 on the other hand, was a pure municipal
liability case. Apparently believing it was obligated to do so, the City released to
defense counsel for a drug-related gang detailed personal information from the
personnel files of a number of undercover police officers. 78 Among other rulings,
the Sixth Circuit found liability under the state-created danger theory. 27 9 Because
272

Id.; see also Malik v. Brown, 71 F.3d 724 (9th Cir. 1995); Marsh v. Am, 937 F.2d

1056, 1066 (6th Cir. 1991) (rejecting defendants' argument that the law was not clearly
established at the time of the violation because a subsequent higher standard of liability "does
not preclude a finding that defendants were on notice" that their conduct was "actionable"
at the time of the original, easier, test); Brown v. Glossip, 878 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1989).
273 165 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 1998).
274
275

276
277
278
279

Id. at 513.
Id. at 517-18.
Id. at 518.
136 F.3d 1055 (6th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1059.
id. at 1067.
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the lawsuit was against the City, there was no discussion of qualified immunity or
"clearly-established" law. The only issue was whether the release, putting the officers in the way of danger from the gang members, was a constitutional violation.8 °
Where a municipality is "held independently liable for a substantive due
process violation," even though "none of its employees are liable," '' there might
be a City of Los Angeles v. Heller28 2 problem. 8 3 That case involved a jury verdict
for a city police officer who was accused of using excessive force during an arrest,
and againstthe municipality.284 In a summary disposition, the Court dismissed the
idea that the disparity was a product of qualified immunity for the individual
officer.28 5 Instead, it explained that there was an inconsistency because the jury
believed that the plaintiff did not suffer a constitutional injury at all (hence, the
individual officer's verdict), while at the same time holding the city liable: "[The
city was] sued only because they were thought legally responsible for [the officer's]
actions; if the latter inflicted no constitutional injury on respondent, it is
86
The opinion went on to state,
inconceivable that [the city] could be liable .... ,,2
that "[i]f a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual
police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorizedthe
use of constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point."28 7 In other words,
in the absence of the kind of excessive force that violated the Constitution, the
imperfections in the city's regulations caused no harm.288
Id. at 1059.
Brown v. Pennsylvania, 318 F.3d 473, 482 (3d Cir. 2003).
282 475 U.S. 796 (1986) (per curiam).
283 But see Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d at 1213 ("The precedent in [the Third Circuit]
requires the district court to review the plaintiffs' municipal liability claims independently
of the section 1983 claims against the individual police officers, as the City's liability for a
substantive due process violation does not depend upon the liability of any police officer.").
For a cogent discussion of Heller and state-of-mind requirements, see Barbara
Kritchevsky, Making Sense of State of Mind: DeterminingResponsibility in Section 1983
280
21

Municipal Liability Litigation, 60 GEO. WASH.L. REv. 417 (1992).

286

Heller, 475 U.S. at 798.
Id.
Id. at 799.

287

Id.

284
285

The dissent, however, complained that there was no inconsistency between the jury's
finding that the officer had carefully followed departmental policy, and its condemnation of
the city's policy of "escalating" force to effect an arrest (culminating in a choke hold). Id. at
802 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The officer's use of force may not have been "unreasonable 'in
the light of all the surrounding circumstances,"' precisely because those circumstances
included his adherence to departmental policy. Id. at 803. On the other hand, a jury could
find the city liable for its "escalating force" policy without being guilty of inconsistency in
this bifurcated trial. Id. at 804. Justice Stevens opined:
[If the Court's unprecedented, ill-considered, and far-reaching decision happens to be correct, defendants as a class have been presented
288
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Heller must first be distinguished from a situation in which the only reason for
the disparate conclusions is the defense of qualified immunity. 289 Municipalities
may be liable because they do not share the individual defense of qualified
immunity, while the officers who violated the Constitution before the law became
"clearly established," may go free. 290 The harder question, however, arises when
there is some other "failure of proof' against the individual officer, for example, on
the state-of-mind prong.29' The circuits are split about the meaning and scope of
Heller.29 2 In Fagan v. City of Vineland (Fagani),

293

the court of appeals held that,

despite Heller's Fourth Amendment ruling, in substantive due process cases "a
with a tactical weapon of great value. By persuading trial judges to bifurcate trials in which both the principal and its agents are named as
defendants, and to require thejury to bring in its verdict on the individual
claim first, they may obtain the benefit of whatever intangible factors
have prompted juries to bring in a multitude of inconsistent verdicts in
past years; defendants will no longer have to abide the mechanisms that
courts have used to mitigate and resolve apparent inconsistencies.
Perhaps that is an appropriate response to the current widespread concern about the potential liabilities of our municipalities, but I doubt it.
Id. at 807-08 (footnote omitted).
289 This was not an issue in Heller because the individual official's defense was never
submitted to the jury. Id. at 798.
290 See, e.g., Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 185, 191 n.18 (5th Cir. 2001) (distinguishing
Heller from situation in which qualified immunity protects the individual officer, but does
not apply to the city).
291 See, e.g., Fairley v. Luman, 281 F.3d913 (9th Cir. 2002). Fairleyrecognizedthat disparate results between individual and municipal liability may occur either where "the officers
are exonerated on the basis of qualified immunity, because they were merely negligent, or for
other failure of proof." Id. at 917 n.4. See also Barrett v. Orange County Human Rights
Comm'n, 194 F.3d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1999); Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir.
1994) ("Supervisory liability maybe imposed under section 1983 notwithstanding the exoneration of the officer whose actions are the immediate or precipitating cause of the constitutional injury."); Cannon v. Taylor, 782 F.2d 947, 951 (11th Cir. 1986) (considering municipal
liability for failure to train after individual defendant officer found not liable because merely
negligent). In Barrett,no one acted alone to violate rights, but the court recognized that "the
combined acts or omissions of several employees acting under a governmental policy or
custom may violate" the Constitution. Id. (quoting Garcia v. Salt Lake County, 768 F.2d 303,
310 (10th Cir. 1985)). Accordingly, the Second Circuit agreed with its sister circuits that a
municipality may be liable even if individual officers are not liable, so long as the injuries
complained of are not attributable solely to the actions of named individual defendants.
292 See, e.g., Brown v. Pennsylvania, 318 F.3d 473, 482 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2003) (collecting
cases) ("[A] municipality [may] be held independently liable for a substantive due process
violation even in situations where none of its employees are liable."); see also Carrie R.
Fowler, Recent Developments, Brown v. Pennsylvania: Asserting That a Municipality Is
Liable for Injuries Caused Even When Its Employees Do Not Commit a Constitutional
Violation, 26 Am.J. TRiAL ADvoc. 707, 709-10 (2003) (collecting cases).
293 22F.3d 1283 (3dCir.), reh'ggranted,22 F.3d 1296(3dCir. 1994) (en banc) (Faganl).
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municipality can be liable under section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment for
a failure to train its police officers with respect to high-speed automobile chases,
even if no individual officer participating in the chase violated the Constitution. 294
While Fagan itself is flawed, its point, nonetheless, is a good one when
properly applied. The Fagancourt was prepared to hold the municipality liable for
the disastrous police chase because "its policymakers, acting with deliberate indifference, implemented a policy of inadequate training and thereby caused the
officers to conduct the pursuit in an unsafe manner and deprive the plaintiffs of life
or liberty. '295 The court opined that the claim against the city was independent of
a claim against the officer, who could only be liable if his conduct "shock[ed] the
conscience., 296 The problem with that analysis is that after Lewis it may be assumed that somewhere, somehow, some conduct or policy has to shock the
conscience. Moreover, for a police chase case like Fagan,Lewis allows the police
great latitude and requires proof of an actual intent to injure. What does this mean
for a Hellerproblem? If the individual officer only acts with deliberate indifference
and not with an intent to injure, how can the city's deliberate indifference to the
need to train that officer in proper police chase procedure provide the missing
element of intent?
Outside of the high-speed chase context, however, disparities between
individual and municipal liability results raise fewer problems. The Supreme Court
also held in Lewis that what constitutes shocking, arbitrary government behavior
varies by the context. As the Court stated, "Deliberate indifference that shocks in
one environment may not be so patently egregious in another.. .,."' The converse
clearly is true as well; the Lewis Court held that the circumstances must be analyzed
before deciding whether there is a due process violation.298 It may be that in a
context where something less than an intent to injure shocks the conscience, the
policy makers' deliberate indifference and failure to train will suffice, even if the
individual officer was merely negligent, or grossly negligent, or even following the
existing policy of the municipality.
In her analysis of Heller and state-of-mind issues, Professor Kritchevsky
cogently argues that there must be room for finding municipal liability even where
no individual defendant has the state of mind required for the constitutional
violation. 299 To do otherwise, she observes, is to ignore the worst kind of systemic
294

Id. at 1294.

295 Id. at 1292.
296 Id. Fagan II conceded that the "shock the conscience" standard applied to individual

liability after Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992), which redefined or at least

clarified "the relevant inquiry when plaintiffs rely on substantive due process as the basis of
the constitutional tort." Fagan H,22 F.3d at 1303.
297 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998).
298 Id. at 850-51.
299 Kritchevsky, supra note 283, at 465.
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governmental abuses which may occur where "[a] culpable policymaking official
[makes] a policy that is carried into effect by lower-ranking personnel who act
blamelessly. '3° She proposed that a municipality should be held liable even if the
official lacks the necessary mental state if the policy makers can be said to have the
requisite "degree of culpability.""3 1 In other words, the constitutional element will
be satisfied so long as the moving force behind the injury meets the standard.
Application of this municipal liability analysis to the state-created danger
case of Kallstrom v. City of Columbus. 2 illustrates the soundness of Kritchevsky's
argument. The city's policy of releasing identifying information was arbitrary
government behavior that "shocked the conscience," regardless of the mental state
of the individual officers who complied with that policy. The individual defendants
were not mentioned in the Third Circuit's decision. The irrelevance of any potential
disparity between their mental states and the culpability of the city was merely
implicit in that case, which only concerned the liability of the city.
Consider also a hypothetical based on White v. Rochford: °3 What if a city's
police department totally failed to train their officers on the protocol for handling
children left alone on the roadside in cars whose drivers were arrested? Surely, the
need for such training is every bit as obvious as the need to teach police officers
how to use weapons in effecting an arrest. 3" If that failure to train caused a police
officer to abandon children whom he had thrown into the snake pit, and the minors
were seriously injured as a consequence, I would argue that the whole chain of
events satisfies the constitutional test. The police exercised their authority to remove the driver and placed the children in a peril that they otherwise would not
have faced; if serious injury resulted, and even if the individual officer was so
untrained that he was merely negligent in not making arrangements for the children,
the municipality's failure to train him for this obvious and foreseeable circumstance
was not only deliberately indifferent, but under those circumstances, it "shocks the
conscience" and constitutes the kind of arbitrary government conduct actionable
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
300 Id.
301 Id. at 470.
302 136 F.3d 1055 (6th Cir. 1998).
303 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).

o Cf. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
For example, city policymakers know to a moral certainty that their
police officers will be required to arrest fleeing felons. The city has
armed the officers with firearms, in part to allow them to accomplish
this task. Thus, the need to train officers in the constitutional limitations
on the use of deadly force can be said to be "so obvious" that failure to
do so could properly be characterized as "deliberate indifference" to
constitutional rights.
Id. at 390 n. 10 (citation omitted).
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CONCLUSION: PASSING THE SMELL TEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION

While every other circuit has made some kind of peace with the state-created
danger doctrine, 0 5 the Fifth Circuit continues to dither."° It has taken advantage
of the differences or "refinements" in the circuit tests for state-created danger to
avoid any ruling on whether, for purposes of qualified immunity that doctrine is
"clearly-established" by overwhelming precedent in sister courts. Consequently,
the Fifth Circuit faces the Texas A&M bonfire cases with little or nothing settled." 7
In 2002, the Fifth Circuit decided McClendon v. City of Columbia (McClendon
I).308 In its rehearing en banc, it reversed the panel's opinion by the late Judge
Politz, which explicitly accepted the state-created danger doctrine. 309 The unsuccessful plaintiff was a man who had been shot by a police informant, with the
gun loaned to the assailant by a City of Columbia police detective, for the purpose
305 See

Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 651 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Kallstrom,

136 F.3d at 1066-67; Frances-Colon v. Ramirez, 107 F.3d 62 (1st Cir. 1997); Kneipp v.
Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199,1201, 1208 (3d Cir. 1996); UhIrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1118 (1996); Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1175 (4th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 994 (1995); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1125
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 947 (1993); Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94,
98-99 (2d Cir. 1993); Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 54-55 (8th Cir. 1990); Cornelius
v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348, 356 (11 th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1066
(1990), andoverruled on othergrounds,White v. Lemacks, 183 F.3d 1253 (1 th Cir. 1999);
Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 590 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 938 (1990).
No circuit has rejected the doctrine, even if the case at bar failed to meet the standard.
306 See Beltran v. City of El Paso, 367 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding it unnecessary to
reach state-created danger theory because pleading in mishandling of 9-1-1 call alleged no
more than negligence); Priester v. Lowndes County, 354 F.3d 414,422 (5th Cir. 2004) (not
reaching state-created danger issue because waived on appeal); Rivera v. Houston Indep.
Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 2003) (involving a middle school child killed in gangrelated fight school officials failed to break up); Scanlan v. Tex. A&M Univ., 343 F.3d 533
(5th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging that the court of appeals has never recognized the statecreated danger doctrine, but reversing dismissal and remanding to district court for further
proceedings); McKinney v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 309 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 2002) (concluding that conduct did not amount to deliberate indifference where bus driver who
transported special education students with behavioral problems was severely injured in an
assault); Morin v. Moore, 309 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding no evidence defendant put
victims in more dangerous position).
307 See infra notes 331-32 and accompanying text.
308 305 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam) (McClendon I1) (vacating panel
decision and finding detective was entitled to qualified immunity), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
1232 (2003).
31 Id. at 319. The vacated decision had expressly embraced the state-created danger
theory. McClendon v. City of Columbia, 258 F.3d 432,441-43 (5th Cir. 2001) (McClendon
1), vacated & reh'g en banc granted,285 F.3d 1078 (5th Cir. 2002).
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of the informant's using it to "protect" himself from the ultimate victim.3 1 While
reversing the panel, McClendon nonetheless declined to settle the state-created
danger theory issue. In the end, it was not clear whether the Fifth Circuit was
tempted to reject the doctrine out of hand, or whether it simply wanted to "duck the
issue" yet again.'

The McClendon court chose to emphasize differences rather than similarities
although it made the following concession:
[M]any of our sister circuits have read [DeShaney's] language
to suggest that state officials can have a duty to protect an
individual from injuries inflicted by a third party if the state
actor played an affirmative role in creating or exacerbating a
dangerous situation that led to the individual's injury.3" 2
The majority noted that the cases arose in a "variety of factual contexts" and
reflected "a variety of tests" designed to satisfy the standard.3 3
These dissimilarities allowed the Fifth Circuit two bites at the apple of the
qualified immunity defense. First, the court of appeals found no constitutional
violation.31 4 According to the court, the allegations about the detective's loan of his
gun to the informant amounted to no more than mere negligence. Far from being
sufficient to violate substantive due process rights, "at a minimum," the standard
required to find a violation is "deliberate indifference," even assuming the statecreated danger doctrine to be a viable theory at all.3" 5
Judge Parker dissented, asking, "What does the majority think Loftin intended
to do with the gun provided to him by Detective Carney - place it on his wall as
'
a souvenir?"316
He answered, "Of course not, gang members who ask for guns
typically have violent intentions as any competent police officer knows."3" 7 To the
dissent, giving a police gun to an informant was much worse than "inadvisable"; 3" 8

310
31

McClendon II, 305 F.3d at 319.
Id. at 334 (Parker, J., dissenting). Judge Parker and his fellow dissenters observed,

"Over the last ten years, at least seven state-created danger cases have arrived in our Circuit,
but we have never taken a position on whether the state-created danger theory is a valid one,
choosing instead to duck the issue." Id.
32' Id. at 324.

323 id. at 324-25.
314

Id. at 326. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232-33 (1991) (directing courts to

make this inquiry first).
311 McClendon I1,305 F.3d at 326.
316 Id. at 339 (Parker, J., dissenting).
317 id.
318 Id. at 340 (quoting majority).
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indeed, it was "criminal. '3 9 He thought that a rational jury could well find
culpability way beyond negligence.
The Fifth Circuit rejected McClendon's claim on a second basis too: "Even if
we were to find . . . a viable constitutional claim under current law . . . [the

detective's] conduct was not objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established
law at the time of his actions."32 The Fifth Circuit had to acknowledge two
difficulties in their position. The first was that a law may be considered "clearly
established" even without a Supreme Court decision or controlling precedent in the
litigant's own circuit.321 Second, the court conceded that the six circuits that had
considered the issue by the time of this conduct had recognized the DeShaney statecreated danger exception (and none had rejected it).322 Nonetheless, the majority
insisted that the trend in its sister circuits did not constitute a "consensus of cases
of persuasive authoritysuch that a reasonableofficer could not have believed that
'
his actions were lawful."323
Instead of consensus, the Fifth Circuit saw disagree-

ments about "the specific nature of that right," noting that other courts "disagreed
as to the appropriate mental state required to hold a state actor liable for harms
inflicted by third parties."324 Some circuits adopted "deliberate indifference,"325 one
'
embraced "a slightly different 'gross negligence' test,"326
and still another "hinted
' 327
that intent to injure might be required.
Even though these standards all demanded more than simple negligence, the Fifth Circuit emphasized the distinctions rather
than the similarities. Moreover, the McClendon majority found the factual dissimilarities among the cases "significant."3 2 In spite of the Supreme Court's recent
reminder in Hope v. Pelzer329 that a novel factual situation does not defeat a claim
of "clearly established law," the Fifth Circuit found that their new circumstances
330
made a difference.
319 Id. In his separate dissent, Judge Wiener noted that he was equally unbelieving that the
majority could characterize the facts as nothing more than negligence. Rather, he saw
evidence of recklessness and deliberate indifference to the constitutional right to inviolate
bodily integrity. In fact, Judge Wiener doubted that this was a state-created danger case at
all, and thought that it implicated instead the long-established right to bodily integrity, raising
only a causation question about the link between the arming and the injury. Id. at 342-43
(Wiener, J., dissenting).
320 Id. at 327.
321 Id. at 329.
322 Id. at 330.
323 Id. at 329 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999)).
324 Id. at 331.
325 Id. (quoting L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 122-23 (9th Cir. 1992)).
326 Id. (quoting Nishiyama v. Dickson County, 814 F.2d 277, 282 (6th Cir. 1987)).
327 Id. (quoting Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1993)).
328 Id. at 332.
329 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
330 McClendon I1,
305 F.3d at 332.
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The Fifth Circuit's particularly narrow reading in McClendon of clearly
established law may keep litigants at a stalemate."' Unless, and until, the Supreme
Court makes its pronouncement or the other circuits shake down to a remarkable
degree of uniformity, each new case will face the same barrier: We do not say
whether the doctrine exists, and even if it does, our not saying makes it not clearly
established law. 332
The Fifth Circuit's next opportunity to settle the issue may come in the appeal
of the Texas A&M bonfire cases. In the early morning of November 18, 1999,
dozens of students were working to construct a bonfire "stack," using thousands of
logs that already reached fifty-five feet high and weighed millions of pounds, to be
burned, as was the tradition of many years, on the night of the A&M-UT football
game.333 Tragically, the stack collapsed, killing twelve people and injuring twentyseven others.334 The bonfire is an old and revered tradition in Texas and the
collapse was very traumatic for the school and for the community. As a result, the
bonfire tragedy has been the subject of a blue-ribbon investigation convened by
Texas A&M, which resulted in a report by the Special Commission.333
331 See id. at 333 (Jolly, J., concurring). Although concurring, Judge Jolly agreed with the
part of Judge Parker's dissent that criticized the majority for not reaching the specific
contours of state-created danger causes of action and leaving it in doubt again. Id.; see supra
note 311 and accompanying text (summarizing Judge Parker's dissent).
332 Following McClendon, a panel hearing an appeal from the first dismissal of the Texas
A&M bonfire cases concluded that although the Fifth Circuit had never explicitly adopted
state-created danger doctrine, it had set out its elements in a 1994 case. Scanlan v. Tex. A&M
Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 537 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Johnson v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d
198 (5th Cir. 1994)). These components were proof that the official used state authority "to
create a dangerous environment for the plaintiff and that the defendants acted with deliberate
indifference to the plight of the plaintiff." Id. at 537-38. "[T]o establish deliberate
indifference,... the 'environment created by the state actors must be dangerous; they must
know it is dangerous; and.., they must have used their authority to create an opportunity
that would not otherwise have existed for the third party's crime to occur."' Id. at 538
(quoting Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 537, 585 (5th Cir. 2001)). The Scanlan
court concluded that, construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the facts pled were
enough to preclude summary judgment. Id.
On the other hand, a subsequent panel interpreted Scanlan in a very limited sense.
Rivera v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 249 n.5 (5th Cir. 2003). Rivera
explained that the remand in Scanlan did not mean that the Fifth Circuit had, at long
last, finally embraced the state-created danger doctrine. Id. On remand from the Fifth
Circuit decision in Scanlan, the district court observed that "[t]he Fifth Circuit has laid out
the requirements a Plaintiff must meet in order to qualify for relief under the state-created
danger theory," but also maintained that the new course set by Scanlan was repudiated in
Rivera. Davis v. Southerland, No. Civ.A.G-0 1-720,2004 WL 1230278, at *4 (S.D. Tex. May
21, 2004).
...Brief of Appellants, Scanlan, Breen, Kimmel and Davis at 5, Scanlan (No. 02-41166).
'34 Id. at 8.
...See SPECIAL COMMISSION ON THE 1999 TEXAS A&M BONFIRE, FINAL REPORT, http:/f
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A number of lawsuits were brought on behalf of the victims, alleging, inter alia,
state-created danger, but the district court judge twice dismissed the federal
claims.336 Because of the intervening court of appeals ruling in Scanlan v. Texas
A&M, 337 which appeared to endorse the state-created danger theory, the dismissals
rested on different grounds. On his second consideration, the judge assumed that
state-created danger stated a claim in the Fifth Circuit.33 The bonfire trial court
identified two basic criteria for this doctrine. First, the state actors had to increase
the danger to the victims. Second, they had to do so while acting with deliberate
indifference. 339 Deliberate indifference is defined as "'a lesser form of intent' rather
This state of mind is shown by proof
than a 'heightened form of negligence."'
that the "environment created by the state actors [is] dangerous; they ... know it is
dangerous; and... they.., used their authority to create an opportunity that would
not otherwise have existed for the [third party's] crime to occur. "341 In essence, the
state actors have to put someone in danger and to strip them from their ability to
defend themselves or to be rescued by others.342 Under the increased danger and
deliberate indifference criteria, the district court now found that there were fact
issues that precluded any dismissal as a matter of law. Despite the "fact questions"
remaining, however, the defendants still prevailed on the second prong of qualified
immunity. The district court found that whatever the status of the law today, it was
not clearly-established in 1999. As a result, the A&M officials retained their
qualified immunity and the lawsuits were dismissed once again.343
The bonfire tragedy is a confounding test case for state-created danger in the
Fifth Circuit. The scale of the tragedy and the symbolic significance of a revered
tradition alone ensure interest. 344 Narrated from one point of view, it resembles
www.tamu.edu/bonfire-commission/reports/Final.pdf (May 2, 2000) [hereinafter
REPORT].
336 See,

FINAL

e.g., Davis, 2004 WL 1230278; Breen v. Tex. A&M Univ., 213 F. Supp. 2d 766,

767 (S.D. Tex. 2002). The second dismissal is currently on appeal to the Fifth Circuit.
Telephone Interview with Steven DeWolf, Attorney for Petitioners (Feb. 22, 2005). There
has been a partial settlement of state law claims against other defendants in an unrelated
lawsuit. See Silla Brush, Part ofA&M Bonfire Suit Settled; Families Reach $4.25 Million
Agreement with Some Student Leaders, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 20,2004, at 6A. The
rest of the state case is set for trial in 2005. Id.
317 343 F.3d 533 (5th Cir. 2003).
338 Davis, 2004 WL 1230278, at *5.
339 Id. at *4.

4 Id. (quoting Lefall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 531 (5th Cir. 1994)).
Id. (quoting Johnson v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198, 201 (5th Cir. 1994)).

341
342

Id.

Id. at *1.
The tradition began in 1909 with the burning of a trash heap, and has continued and
grown for 90 years until it has become "one of most cherished traditions" of Texas A&M,
"uniting students, administrators, alumni and the surrounding community each September,
343
34
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nothing so much as, at the worst, a tort345 with horrible consequences, but one which
belongs conceptually on the other side of the federal constitutional line. The
plaintiffs' account, however, is quite different and is touched with a much greater
sense of abuse of government power.
In their first motions to dismiss, the court relied on a version of the facts reflected by the findings of the A&M-sponsored commission.346 According to the
district court's first opinion, the investigatory commission's Final Report charac'
terized the collapse as a "containment failure"347
in the first tier of logs caused by

improper binding of the support wires and by "aggressive wedging of second tier
logs into the first tier."348 The producing factors included "the absence of a proactive risk management model; the University community's cultural bias impeding
risk identification; the lack of student leadership knowledge and skills pertaining
to structural integrity; and the lack of formal, written Bonfire design plans or
'
construction methodology."349
The Final Report further indicated to the district
court that "students were permitted to construct a complex and dangerous structure
without adequate engineering supervision or physical safety controls."3 ' No single
failure caused the collapse, but rather it was a culmination of "decisions and actions
taken by both students and University officials over many, many years."' 35 ' This
description of the tragedy sounds like an ordinary, if terrible, tort.
By contrast, counsel for the Scanlan, Breen, Kimmel, and Davis plaintiffs
painted a more foreboding picture. Bonfire was a University-sponsored event that
A&M had used as a recruiting and promotional tool over the years.352 The
University controlled the location and existence of the Bonfire,353 and was fully
cognizant that building the stack was an extremely dangerous activity, fraught with
October and November." Five thousand students invested 125,000 hrs each fall to build it
and 40,000-80,000 spectators watch it bum. Breen v. Tex. A&M Univ., 213 F. Supp. 2d
766, 769 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
" The federal court had dismissed without prejudice the six supplemental state law
negligence claims because of its dismissal of the federal claims, declining to exercise its
jurisdiction under the circumstances. Id. at 777-78.
346 id. at 769.

Id. at 771 (quoting FINAL REPORT).
348 Id. The Fifth Circuit subsequently criticized the district court for relying on the
17

defendant-sponsored Final Report, which was outside of the record, for its own findings on
a motion to dismiss, and reversed in part on that basis. Scanlan, 343 F.3d at 536-37.
34 Breen, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 771.
350 Id.
351 Id. There had been partial collapse in 1994 that failed to trigger a design
re-evaluation,
perhaps because it was seen to be caused by wet ground, and not by structural problems.
Brief of Appellants at 18, Scanlan (No. 02-41166).
352 Id. at 5, 10. Texas A&M University trademarked the Bonfire logo, and received

revenue from sales of t-shirts and memorabilia. Id.
313

id. at 12-14.
1213

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 13:1139

potential liability for the University."" The plaintiffs further contended that despite
this control and knowledge, the University consciously and intentionally delegated
355
responsibility for the dangerous activity to unqualified and unsupervised students,
356
'
To make
whom President Bowen testified were just "children in big bodies."
matters worse, one of the foremost engineering schools of the country allegedly
deliberately chose to provide no supervision or engineering support for this massive
undertaking, even though they knew they had responsibility for the safety of the
students involved." 7 The plaintiffs' final contention was very serious; they alleged
that the University sponsored and benefitted from Bonfire, but refused to supervise
it properly for the simple purpose of evading potential liability.358 In other words,
they were prepared to put students in the way of harm in order to gain a legal
advantage if, and when, that harm occurred.359
Counsel for the Self, Comstock, and other plaintiffs outlined the state-created
danger doctrine, tracing it from its origins in DeShaney through its development in
sister circuits and its treatment in the Fifth.3 ' From this review, the plaintiffs
concluded that there were two elements to state-created danger: "(1) the state actors
created or increased the danger to the plaintiff, and (2) the state actors acted with
deliberate indifference."'36' Alternative formulations of the same test explained that
the state actors must have culpable knowledge of the danger and must have used
their authority to create that risk.3 62 As the Fifth Circuit observed in Johnson v.

'54

Id. at 14-20.

...Id. at 20-25.
356 Id. at 25.
...Id. at 26-32.

...Id. at 34-36.
359
Instead of doing what they were supposed to do, the A&M
Officials knowingly and deliberately created a danger zone, actively
encouraging students to enter - all the while making money on
Bonfire and using it to promote A&M. They knew the danger but did
not care - "it was the culture of Bonfire to let the students do it." They
justified turning a blind eye because it gave students "leadership
experience." Secretly they feared if they took control, A&M might
become liable. So they callously let the children working on Bonfire
come into harms' [sic] way.
Id. at 52.
" Consolidated Brief for Appellants in the Self, et al. Case (No. 02-41204) and in the
Comstock, et al. Case (No. 02-41222) at 34-40, Scanlan (No. 02-41166) [hereinafter
Consolidated Brief].
361 Id. at40 (citing McKinney v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 309 F.3d 308, 313-14 (5th Cir.
2002); Morin v. Moore, 309 F.3d 316, 321-22 (5th Cit. 2002)).
362 Id. at 41. The appellants cited Johnson v. DallasIndependent School District,38 F.3d
198, 201 (5th Cit. 1994), and the McKinney and Morin opinions, which "subsume[d]" the
Johnson factors. Id.
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Dallas Independent School District,363 "[T]he key to the state-created danger

cases.., lies in the state actors' culpable knowledge and conduct in 'affirmatively
placing an individual in a position of danger, effectively stripping a person of her
ability to defend herself, or cutting off potential sources of private aid.'361
In this Article, I have suggested that the state-created danger doctrine includes
the following elements (which can be collapsed together as the Self, Consolidated
Brief did, or teased out as stated here): (1) Did state officials exercise authority or
power; (2) in such a way that they put someone in a worse position than they would
otherwise have occupied; (3) risking and causing a significant harm; (4) with a
degree of culpability (which might be deliberate indifference) amounting to
conscience-shocking behavior in the factual context? As I noted, the first two
properly constitute the heart of the state-created danger doctrine because they
define the existence of an affirmative duty in exceptional circumstances.
Significant harm may be collapsed into the state-of-mind inquiry, which has
assumed new prominence in the last decade.
Do the Bonfire cases pass the smell test, i.e., are they of constitutional stature?
Even giving credence to the plaintiffs' version of the facts as is required at an early
stage of litigation, this is still a case on the cusp. The allegations (and the testimony
to date) certainly indicate a very dangerous situation that was created by A&M
officials with apparent awareness of the risks entailed and which in fact led to
terrible injuries and loss of life. In this context, however, was their deliberate
indifference the kind of conscience-shocking arbitrary government behavior that is
subsumed under the Due Process Clause? Texas A&M officials exercised their
authority to create danger in a somewhat different sense than in many of the other
cases. Although Bonfire was a University-sponsored event built on University
property with University money, and University officials selected the student
"Redpots" (supervisors) who they put in charge despite their lack of qualifications, 36 5 University officials technically did not send the students who participated
up onto the stack. Allegedly, however, high-level officials did create the danger and
then abandon the students to the danger, effectively cutting them off from other
forms of professional aid.a" The student Redpots were put in charge and the faculty
engineers were told to back off.367 If this was done with deliberate indifference to
a high risk of serious harm"' because the University wanted to exploit Bonfire to
build up the reputation and coffers of a state school, while avoiding potential
363 38 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1017 (1995).
364 Id. at 201 (quoting Wideman v. Shallowford Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1035

(11th Cir. 1987)).
365 Brief of Appellants at 21-26, Scanlan (No. 02-41166).
'66 Id. at 26-30.
367 Id. at 29-34.
368 Id. at 14-20.
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liability for callous disregard of its students' welfare, a court's conscience might
well be shocked.
The state-created danger cases demonstrate that substantive due process remains
a disfavored doctrine. It will not be easy, nor should it be, to hold state officials
responsible for incidents that look, smell, and feel like ordinary torts, committed by
third parties but with some governmental involvement. 69 By contrast, if appropriate inquiry is focused on elements which reflect the abuse of government power,
there will be fewer twists and turns in the road into the substantive due process
3 70

snake pit.

However, I still maintain that DeShaney, the case that started the lower courts along
the state-created danger route, did involve an abuse of government power and was wrongly
decided by the Supreme Court. For my critique of the decision, see Oren, State's Failure,
supra note 3.
370 The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Gonzales v. City of Castle
Rock, 366 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 417 (2004), in
which a divided Tenth Circuit upheld a procedural due process claims against a police
department which repeatedly failed to enforce a Protective Order. The mother of three young
girls alleged that the department's refusal to take action led to the death of the children whose
safety was the subject of that order. In the first decision, a Tenth Circuit panel rejected a
substantive due process claim based on a state-created danger theory. Gonzales v. City of
Castle Rock, 307 F.3d 1258, 1263 (10th Cir. 2002). The court reasoned that the official
inaction in this situation did not cross the line between merely failing to "decrease or
eliminate a pre-existing danger" and "affirmative conduct that creates or enhances a danger,"
a distinction they found both "subtle" and "critical under DeShaney and its progeny." Id. The
facts were as follows: Jessica Gonzales obtained a permanent restraining order against her
estranged husband which excluded him from the family home and prohibited him "from
molesting or disturbing the peace of Ms. Gonzales and their three daughters, ages ten, nine,
and seven." Id. at 1261. He was allowed visitation with his daughters every other weekend,
and by agreement, for a mid-week dinner visit. On a Tuesday, however, he abducted the girls
as they played outside their house without any notice or agreement with their mother. When
she found that her children were gone, "she suspected that Simon, who had a history of
suicidal threats and erratic behavior, had taken them." Id. There followed an increasingly
frantic ten-hour period, during which Jessica repeatedly requested the police department to
honor the mandatory arrest policy incorporated in Colorado statute and in the protective
order on file in the central registry (and available to the police department). Officials refused
to act each and every time, even when she located Simon and the children for them.
[Finally] at 3:20 a.m., Simon Gonzales drove to the Castle Rock Police
Station, got out of his truck, and opened fire with a semi-automatic
handgun he had purchased shortly after abducting his daughters. He
was shot dead at the scene. The police discovered the three girls, who
had been murdered by Simon earlier that evening, in the cab of his
truck.
Id. at 1262. The panel found that these circumstances squarely fit the DeShaney mold. Id. at
1262-63. The claim failed to satisfy the very first element of the danger creation test: "[T]he
charged state entity and the charged individual actors created the danger or increased
plaintiff's vulnerability to the danger in some way." Id. at 1263. Failing to enforce the
369
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protective order, in their view, did not create or enhance the danger created by Simon's
abduction of the girls. Id. Having disposed of the state-created danger claim, however, the
panel went on to consider favorably the argument that Colorado law gave Ms. Gonzales a
protected property interest in receiving the promised protective services. It is this claim
which garnered the support of a majority of the divided Tenth Circuit, en banc, and which
is under consideration in the Supreme Court.
While procedural due process is the only question ostensibly before the Court, it is
ineluctably intertwined with the fate of the state-created danger doctrine. Indeed, the
"questions presented" by the petitioners are all about whether or not the procedural due
process claim is an end-run around DeShaney. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i,
Gonzales (No. 04-278). It is unclear how the Court will handle these contentions, and Castle
Rock therefore is beyond the scope of the current Article.
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